- 尖閣480年史 - いしゐのぞむブログ 480 years history of Senkakus

senkaku480 石井望。長崎純心大學准教授。笹川平和財團海洋政策研究所島嶼資料センター島嶼資料調査委員。日本安全保障戰略研究所研究員。内閣官房領土室委託尖閣資料調査事業特別研究員。 御聯絡は長崎純心大學(FAX 095-849-1894) もしくはJ-globalの上部の「この研究者にコンタクトする」  http://jglobal.jst.go.jp/detail.php?JGLOBAL_ID=200901032759673007 からお願ひします。 


http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-no01-25857-1.shtml
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_485f2bc80100fkwz.html
“李約瑟難題”為什麼是偽問題?——《南方週末》專訪
載《南方週末》2001.5.24.  
江曉原 袁幼鳴(《南方週末》記者)
網路或作「李約瑟難題是偽問題」。

    時至今日,在幾代中國知識分子心目中,英國著名學者李約瑟就是中國科學技術史的同義詞;也許認真閲讀過李約瑟所主編巨著《中國科學技術史》的人只是少數,但我們都 深信他的結論——中國科學技術曾經在很長時間處世界領先地位,只是到了近現代才落後於西方——為什麼會落後即著名的“李約瑟難題”。   
  可能會令我們感情上一時難以接受,近幾年來,國內一些從事相關研究的中青年學者紛紛對李氏的研究予以客觀的認識,並逐步匯聚成一個聲音:“李約瑟難題”是一個不成立的偽問題。   

  為什麼說“李約瑟難題”是一個偽問題?李約瑟研究的真正價值何在?重新評價李約瑟,給公眾一個真實的李約瑟本身有什麼意義?4月17日,記者專訪了上海交通大學科學史系主任江曉原教授。

媒體對李約瑟的“過濾”   
  記者:提起中國古代科學技術史,自然就會想到李約瑟。幾代人,包括學習過科學史專業的研究生,基本上都未懷疑過他關於中國古代科學技術地位的結論,主要原因是什麼?   

  江曉原:自1954年在劍橋出版《中國科學技術史》第一卷《總論》起,在西方孤立中國的背景下,有李約瑟這樣一位西方知名學者一卷卷地編寫、出版弘揚中國文化的巨著,還為中英友好和交往而奔走,當然非常令人感激。 但是關於李約瑟,多年來媒體給公眾造 成的印象並不正確,至少很不全面。可以說,在特定的歷史背景下,中國“選中”了李約 瑟,但對他的工作成果進行“過濾”。   

  由於中國至少一個多世紀以來一致處在貧窮落後的狀態中,科學技術的落後尤其明 顯,因此,李約瑟研究出來的那些“中國的世界第一”立刻被用來“提高民族自尊心”。而在這種影響下,中國科學史似乎也理當等同於搜尋、列舉中國歷史上各種發明、成就的功勞簿。如此,又進一步強化了李約瑟在中國人心目中的地位。

 

李約瑟的不足之處
  記者:那麼,冷靜、理性地分析,李約瑟的研究及巨著在學術上有什麼不足呢?  

  江曉原:對於李約瑟研究中國科學技術史的工作本身,海內外許多學者曾指出各種具體錯誤,這些錯誤絲毫不能否定李約瑟的巨大成就。人非聖賢,孰能無過?何況是這樣浩大的學術工程?   

  就全書整體而言,李約瑟出於對中國傳統文明的熱愛和迷戀,在不少問題上有對中國古代成就的拔高傾向。影響所及,難免造成國內一些論著在談論祖先成就時夜郎自大般的虛驕情緒。如果說這種傾向在他本人尚不足為大病,那麼近年坦普爾著書談“中國的一百個世界第一”,有很多穿鑿附會的地方,起到了推波助瀾的作用。   

  李約瑟和中國文化的淵源,從他和魯桂珍相遇開始——有些學者還注意到當時魯年輕貌美,此後他的思想和興趣發生了巨大轉變。魯後來成為他終身的生活和工作伴侶,最終成為他的第二任妻子。他在《李約瑟文集》中文版序言中說:“後來我發生了信仰上的皈依(conversion),我深思熟慮地用了這個詞,因為頗有點像聖保羅在去大馬士革的路上發生的皈依那樣,……命運使我以一種特殊的方式皈依到中國文化價值和中國文明這方面來。”   

  記者:假如李約瑟沒有與魯桂珍相遇,假如魯不是那麼“年輕貌美”,那麼這種“皈依”很可能就不會發生?   
  江曉原:假如李約瑟不遇到魯桂珍,這種“皈依”就不會發生,多半是可以斷言的。至於“年輕貌美”起了多大作用,我們既不能起先哲於地下而問之,也就不必多加猜測了。   

  李約瑟對中國文明的熱愛既已成為某種宗教式的熱情,難免會對研究態度的客觀性有所影響。而李約瑟的“硬傷”更具體的根源是他對中國道教及道家學說的過分熱愛——熱愛到了妨礙他進行客觀研究、誇大道家在中國科技史中作用的地步。   

  李約瑟工作的另一個方面“硬傷”,可以參考我國台灣學者朱浤源的意見:李約瑟雖然在生物化學方面早有成就,37歲時便成為英國皇家學會會員,但他並未受過科學史或科學哲學的專業訓練,因此,未能“把什麼是科學加以定義”成為李約瑟的一大困境。而實際上,李約瑟有時拔高古代中國人的成就,也和不對科學加以界定有關係。  

  朱浤源指出:由於沒有定義,哪些學問、哪些材料應該納入,哪些不應該納入,就沒有客觀的標準,從事抉擇的時候,較難劃定統一的範圍。結果原來計劃寫一本書解決這個問題,後來要寫幾卷,再後來每卷又有分冊,編撰工作攤子越鋪越大,分冊越出越多,達到70多冊;到李約瑟去世時,他的構想要想完成看來遙遙無期。   

  記者:依您之見,應如何對“科學”加以界定?   

  江曉原:對科學的界定,可以見仁見智,並不存在一致公認的標準。比如現代西方學術界,普遍不將數學、醫學兩門學問列入科學範圍之內,而在中國,這兩門學問列入科學範圍則似乎是天經地義的。在朱浤源所指出的問題上,關鍵不是怎樣界定,而是有沒有界定——只要你在工作展開之前給出一個界定,你就可以在理論上爭取自圓其說,工作的範圍也就不致於越來越大,漫無邊際了。

 

“李約瑟難題”到底成不成立?   
  記者:說“李約瑟難題”是一個偽問題,依據是什麼?   

  江曉原:如果我們站在客觀的立場觀照近現代科學的來龍去脈,不難發現,所謂的“李約瑟難題”實際上是一個偽問題(當然偽問題也可以有啟發意義)。那種認為中國科學技術在很長時間裡世界領先的圖景,相當大程度上是虛構出來的——事實上西方人走著另一條路,而在後面並沒有人跟著走的情況下,中國“領先”又從何說起呢?這就好比一個人向東走,一個人向南走,你不能說向南走的人是落後還是領先向東走的人——只有兩個人在同一條路上,並且向同一個方向走,才會有領先和落後之分。   

  記者:您的意思是,這種領先——譬如說,李氏在中文版序言中所提到的某類機械裝置領先於歐洲的同類裝置幾個世紀——是沒有意義的?   

  江曉原:這倒不是。就某種具體的裝置而言,比較先進落後,可以是有意義的(當然也要看怎麼比法),因為這可以看成雙方是在同一條路、同一方向上走。但某些具體裝置或知識,不能等同於整體。如果找到若干具體裝置方面中國領先的例子,就得出中國在整 體上領先的結論,那麼同樣還有具體裝置方面中國落後的例子(這樣的例子在西方科學史家那裡也多得是,只是我們通常絶口不提,比如有的科學史權威認為,機械鐘錶早在古希臘時代就已經有了),難道就要得出中國在整體上落後的結論嗎?   

  記者:李約瑟在探討近代科學何以不能在中國誕生時,比較強調社會和經濟方面的因素,如封建官僚制度的束縛及商業刺激的影響。他相信,假如在古代中國社會中真的能出現與歐洲相對應的社會變化和經濟變化的話,那麼某種形式的近代科學也會在那裡出現。您認為這種探討是否有意義?   

  江曉原:我看沒有多大意義。因為事實上這種社會變化和經濟變化並未在古代中國出現。   

  不容否認,在唐朝時,中國可能是世界上最強盛的國家,但在世界的歷史長河中,國力最強盛的國家並不一定就是科技最領先的國家,兩者不一定同步。國力強盛有共同的衡量標準,科技文化先進與否的標準要複雜許多。而且,科學史意義上的科技發達同現代意義上的科技發達,考量標準也不一樣。   

  如果我們從今天世界科學的現狀出發回溯,我們將不得不承認,古希臘的科學與今天的科學最接近——恩格斯曾經說過,當我們要討論精密科學的時候,我們不得不回到古希臘人那裡去,這話至今仍是正確的。考察科學史可以看出,現代科學甚至在形式上都還保留著極強的古希臘色彩,而今天整個科學發現模式在古希臘天文學那裡已經表現得極為完備。   

  記者:既然如此,那如何解釋直到加利略時代之前,科學發現基本上是緩慢進行的, 至少沒有以急劇增長或指數增長的形式發生?

  江曉原:這個問題涉及近來國內科學史界一個爭論的熱點。有些學者認為近現代科學與古希臘科學並無多少共同之處,理由就是古希臘之後為何沒有接著出現近現代科學,反而經歷了漫長的中世紀?這一質問看上去好像非常雄辯,似乎一棍就可將對方打悶,其實只是不能傷人的虛招,用中國一句成語就可破解——枯木逢春。一株在漫長的寒冬看上去 已經死掉的枯木,逢春而漸生新綠,盛夏而枝茂葉盛,你當然無法否認它還是原來那棵樹,你怎麼能質問:為什麼寒冬時它不現新綠?事物的發展演變需要外界的條件。中世紀歐洲遭逢巨變,古希臘科學失去了繼續發展 的條件(限於篇幅,這個問題不作展開),直等到文藝復興之後,才是它枯木逢春之時。

 

李約瑟在西方科學史界的遭遇   
  記者:科學史和科學哲學在西方已是成熟的學科,您已經提到西方學者普遍不同意李約瑟的一些觀點,李約瑟在西方科學史界的真實地位如何呢?   

  江曉原:對國內大部分公眾來說,多年來媒體反覆宣傳造成了這樣一個概念:李約瑟是國際科學史界的代表人物。這個概念其實有很大偏差。   

  真正的持平之論,出自李約瑟身邊最親近的人。魯桂珍曾坦言:李約瑟並不是一位職業漢學家,也不是一位歷史學家。他不曾受過學校的漢語和科學史的正規教育。實際上他根本沒有正式學過科學史,只是在埋頭實驗工作之餘,順便涉獵而已。   

  正因為如此,在西方“正統”科學史家——從“科學史之父”薩頓一脈承傳——中的某些人看來,李約瑟不是“科班出身”,而是“半路出家”的,還不能算是科學史家共同體中的一員。李約瑟還曾抱怨:劍橋東方學院的學者不同他打交道,“一牆之隔”的劍橋 大學科學史系也把他拒之門外,他感嘆“這一現象何其怪異啊!”所以在西方科學史界,對李約瑟不那麼尊敬的大有人在,甚至可以說,李約瑟在西方科學史界受到了相當程度的排斥。

 

李約瑟的真正價值   
  記者:那麼李約瑟的真正貢獻是什麼?李約瑟的真正貢獻也有被“過濾”掉的嗎?

  江曉原:窮數十年之功,研究中國古代科技與文明,李約瑟貢獻巨大,即使西方科學史界也不可能全部抹煞他的功勞。李約瑟貢獻的一個最明顯的方面是,在他的組織下,包括華人學者參與,對中國古代科學技術資料進行了規模宏大的發掘、整理,成就卓著,有目共睹。  

  李約瑟的巨著雖然得到中國學者普遍的讚揚,但並不是書中所有特色都為我們所熱烈歡迎。   

  西方學者對中國古代科技術史的研究,至少在二三百年前就已開始。而李約瑟作為一個西方研究者,很自然地大量介紹和引用了西方漢學家的成果。可惜這一點至今仍然很少被國內學者所注意,他們對這些成果很少接觸和引用。   

  李約瑟在著述時,經常能夠浮現出世界科學技術發展的廣闊背景,這就避免了一些國內研究者“只見樹木,不見森林”的毛病。在這個基礎上,李約瑟經常探討和論證中國古代與異域科學技術相互交流影響的可能性。這樣一來,其他筆下不免出現一些“西來說”。這類交流、影響和“西來說”都為國內許多學者所不喜愛——他們通常隻字不提,只當李約瑟沒說過。有的人士更是只挑選對自己有利的結論加以引用,少數學者甚至嚴重歪曲李約瑟的觀點來證明自己說法。   

  可以毫不誇張地說,至今為止,在中國自己的專家學者中,還沒有人展示過如此廣闊的視野。李約瑟用他的著作架設起來的一座橋樑——溝通中國和西方文化的橋樑——這是李約瑟最重要的貢獻。 為什麼要重新評價李約瑟   

  記者:重新評介李約瑟及其研究,這一學術行為本身有什麼意義?

  江曉原:以往的“過濾”之法,使國人普遍對中國科學技術歷史、對李約瑟本人,對若干相關問題產生了不準確,不全面的認識,科學史工作者有責任和義務依據詳實的事實材料,給以重新評介。   

  至今仍有某些大眾傳媒,堅決地試圖“過濾”關於李約瑟的真實材料,理由是“維護李約瑟的形象”。其實他們要維護的所謂形象,是“過濾”之後的形象,這並不是真實的形象,也不是李約瑟本人所希望向中國人呈現的形象。   

  當年一些英國的歷史學家站在新教徒和輝格黨人的立場上進行寫作,將歷史寫成對自己政治理念的頌揚,或者至少是認可。這種做法被稱為“輝格史學”。“輝格史學”的情結在許多中國人身上也是根深蒂固的,儘管他們不一定知道輝格黨人。我認為,李約瑟本人絶對無意將他的巨著寫成一部輝格式的科學史著作,但是許多中國人卻戴著“輝格眼鏡”去看待李約瑟,儘力將李約瑟的工作塑造成一個“輝格史學”的中國版本。我們今天盡可 能客觀地重新評價李約瑟及其工作,就是為了不再繼續誤導公眾。

  記者:最後一個問題。愛因斯坦在評論中國古代的發明時,曾這樣說:“西方科學的發展是以兩個偉大的成就為基礎的,那就是古希臘哲學家所發明的形式邏輯體系,以及(在文藝復興時期)發現通過系統的實驗可能找出因果關係。在我看來,中國的賢哲沒有走上這兩步,那是用不著驚奇的。要是這些發現果然都作出了,那倒是令人驚奇的事。”作為一位科學史家,請問您對此有何看法?   

  江曉原:我認為愛因斯坦所說完全正確。今天我們坦然承認這一點,對我們正在進行的努力是大有好處的——直到今天,我們仍然在很多問題上違反形式邏輯,在很多問題上拒絶接受實驗已經證明的因果關係。
(發表時有少量刪改,此為原定版本)

江曉原

全面解析「四大發明」神話的謊言之四——造紙術
雪花新聞 十二年讀史 (疑即飛虎隊)  2018-07-07 5:45:15
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紙,國際上不承認那是中國最早發明的,因為早在五千年前,在中國的紙出現之前三千年前,古埃及人就已經發明了最古老的紙,稱之為紙莎草紙(Papyrus),也稱紙草紙,英文中紙(paper)這個單詞就是來源於拉丁文Papyrus(紙莎草紙),可見這種紙在西方古代應用的廣泛和悠久。使用長達三千年之久。公元10世紀後才逐漸停止使用。

websters大辭典上講述紙的歷史就是從紙草紙開始敘述的:【HistoryA form of paper called papyrus, made from reedss, was made as early as 3000 BC in ancient Egypt, and then in ancient Greece and ancient Rome.】──可見,國際上認為紙草紙是最早的紙。

紙草紙不僅是古埃及重要的書寫材料,而且也大量出口到其他國家,成為古埃及人,古希臘人,古羅馬人,亞述人,腓尼基人,阿拉伯人所廣泛使用的書寫材料,迄今為止所發現的用古埃及文、古希臘文、古羅馬文和阿拉伯文等書寫的紙草紙文獻,數以十萬張計之多,紙草紙文獻上記載了大量的古代法律、宗教銘文、天文地理、文學,數學知識等珍貴歷史資料,其中歷史最早的是從古法老墓葬出土的距今五千多年前的無字紙,載有文字的紙草紙文獻距今也有四千五百多年的歷史了,比我們中國人使用甲骨文還早了近兩千年。

這種用紙草紙寫成的書籍,雖歷經數千年,仍然清晰如新,紙質決不比我們中國的紙差,而且紙草紙也不像有人說的那樣,容易斷裂,現在埃及都還有根據古代技術進行製造的紙草紙,造出的紙任意摺疊完全沒有問題。世界上很多博物館都收藏有這種紙草紙古籍,象前文提到的林德手卷(Rhind papyrus,又稱為萊因德紙草書,是公元前1650年左右的埃及數學著作),就收藏在大英博物館。

有人否定說,古埃及人發明的紙不能算真正的紙,因為不是植物纖維的紙,甚至說紙草紙是跟甲骨,竹簡同樣的東西。這是無知的強詞奪理。紙草紙就是用植物纖維做的紙,跟甲骨,竹簡是性質完全不同的東西。

來看看紙草紙的製造工藝:

「青年取出一根紙草,割下三四十厘米長一段,用小刀將外面綠色的硬皮削去,露出淺色的內莖,又將它切成一片片薄片。但那時的薄片很脆,用手一折就斷,而一個小水槽中浸泡著的薄片顏色已變為淺黃,拿在手裡可以任意彎曲。他告訴我們,由於新鮮的紙草莖中含有糖分,必須浸泡6天,才能消除糖分,成為造紙原料。接著他表演第二道工序,從水槽中撈出浸透了的薄片,先用木棰敲平整,再用一根像擀麵杖一樣的圓棍擠盡水分,然後將這些薄片縱橫交錯的疊成一片。最後一道工序是將它放在一台鐵板壓中壓緊,放置滿6天後就成為紙草紙成品。他將疊在一起的薄片放入壓機後,將鐵板轉緊,兩分鐘後取出薄片,但見相互間已經粘在一起。可以想像,6天後還是什麼情形。果然,接過他取來的一片成品,用兩手抖動就嘩嘩作響,可以隨意摺疊,透過光照,可以看到縱橫的纖維,厚薄雖不太均勻,薄處成半透明,但已渾然一體。不過,古埃及人製作時還沒有這些機械,特別是最後一道工序,當時是將薄片平攤在兩層亞麻布中間,然後用石頭或其他重物壓緊,需要的時間更久。」 (摘自葛劍雄《紙草紙的興衰》一文)

從這個製造工序可以看出,紙草紙是將紙莎草纖維分離出來,切斷,浸泡,去除糖分等雜質,然後用木錘敲打,木棍擠壓,去除水分,再交織在一起,經過壓榨,最後製造成型。這就是基本的造紙工序。紙草紙就是真正的紙。

這是websters大辭典上對「紙」的權威解釋:【Paper is a thin, flat material produced by the compression of fibres. The fibres used are usually natural and based upon cellulose. The most common material is wood pulp from softwood trees such as pines, but other materials including cotton (flax) and hemp may be used.】──可見,紙草紙就是符合這幾個特徵的,就是真正的紙。

中國學者為了否認紙草紙,強調紙草紙還沒有經過造紙漿的工序,所以不能算是真正的紙。這是完全沒有道理的。

因為造紙漿的工序是到了東漢蔡倫時才有的,在這之前中國的紙也是沒有造紙漿的工序的,比如,中國官方宣稱發現的中國最早的紙──灞橋紙,就是沒有經過造紙漿步驟製造出來的,它是一種麻纖維的紙,纖維很長,很粗糙,紙面上纖維清晰可見,連紙草紙的精細程度都不如,故此有專家甚至認為它不是人工製造的,可能是自然形成的,但是一樣被看作是紙,由此可看出,造紙漿並不是定義是否是紙的關鍵技術點。是否成其為紙的關鍵技術點,或技術概念,在於是否將植物纖維進行分離,切斷,浸泡,再平整,壓榨成型的製造過程。而造紙漿只是一個更深程度的深加工而已。不是決定本質的關鍵點,只是一種改進。

「紙草紙是古埃及人對人類文明的偉大貢獻,是歷史上最早、最便利的書寫材料。正是紙草紙的發明和推廣,才使人類可以不再用泥、石、木、陶、金屬等材料記錄文字或圖畫,也使古代大量信息得到傳播和保存。」(摘自葛劍雄《紙草紙的興衰》一文)──可以看出,紙草紙是跟泥版,貝葉,甲骨,竹簡,等天然書寫材料性質完全不同的東西,就是最早的,真正的紙,並對文化發展和傳播起到了重大作用,如公元前三世紀,埃及亞歷山大圖書館的希臘文藏書就已經達到了七十萬卷,這是人類歷史上最寶貴的文化遺產。

「但紙草紙也有其自身的缺陷:它的原料單一,只能使用尼羅河流域的新鮮紙草,使它的產地只能局限於埃及,限制了它的推廣。它的製作也比較複雜,成本較高。」(摘自葛劍雄《紙草紙的興衰》一文)──這才是紙草紙後來衰落的原因,僅僅只是因為原料的缺乏問題,而不是因為它作用不大。

紙草紙在世界上很多博物館都有文物收藏,有古埃及從五千年前就保存下來的紙草紙及後來大量的紙草紙文獻,以及中世紀用紙草紙裝訂的書籍,在埃及也有製造出品,在中國也曾經展出過,要判斷紙草紙到底是不是真正的紙,最簡單直接的辦法,就是去把實物找來看看,就知道埃及人發明的確實是紙,而不是像某些人描述的那樣「只是草片」。

中國人常常吹噓:是中國的較為便宜的造紙術傳入西方後才導致文藝復興,科學萌芽,這完全是無知可笑的說法,難道西方人的哲學,科學,文學,等思想,不是從大腦裡面產生出來,而是有了較為便宜的紙以後,突然從紙上變魔術一樣變出來的?這完全是本末倒置,中國式的紙只不過是提供了一種便利條件,有沒有這種便利條件,都不影響西方文明的發展,最多不過增加了一點不方便而已,而且人家完全有其他的替代物,如上面提到的紙草紙,而且,在使用紙草紙的古希臘時代,希臘科學就已經很發達了,就已經湧現出了畢達哥拉斯,蘇格拉底,柏拉圖,亞理士多德,阿基米德,歐幾里德等很多大科學家大哲學家,出現了《幾何原本》《光學》《圓錐曲線》《數學彙編》《荷馬史詩》等偉大的科學和文學著作。而且公元前三世紀,埃及亞歷山大圖書館的希臘文藏書就已經達到了七十萬卷。

而且,西方使用的現代造紙術也沒有可靠的證據能夠證明是從中國傳入的,只能證明阿拉伯的造紙術是公元751年怛羅斯之戰後從中國俘虜那裡學會的,雖然歐洲一直都從阿拉伯人那裡進口中國式的紙,但是出於商業上的壟斷需要,阿拉伯人顯然不可能將造紙的方法透露給西方人,實際上西方人也是到了十二世紀才開始自己獨立造紙,在這之前,顯然有一個長達幾百年的摸索研究的過程,我認為,很可能是西方人同時參考紙草紙和中國紙的製造方法自己研究出了造紙的方法。

歐洲的造紙術跟中國的造紙術有很多的不同,中國傳統造紙術早期使用樹皮,破布,麻頭等等,後來長期使用竹紙,歐洲的竹子少,十九世紀開始廣泛使用木材造紙,他們用的抄紙工具也不是竹簾,而是用木頭和銅絲等作成的「抄網」,這與中國人單人掌簾或者雙人抬簾是不同的,他們在紙漿中不加纖維懸浮劑,所以歐洲的紙張比較厚實和光滑,主要為了適應鵝毛筆和染料墨水書寫的結果。德國和法國又於十八世紀試用各種植物纖維進行紙漿造紙的實驗,英國採用機器代替手工抄紙,以木材為原料的機製紙也得到了迅速發展,造紙工藝早就不是傳統的那種石灰漚竹的土造紙法了,產生了巨大的變革,中國今天使用的倒是西方的機造木材紙工藝。中國現在所用的新聞銅版紙仍然要靠從國外進口。

以前,蔡倫一直被視為造紙術的發明者,後來發現了更早的紙以後,於是就改稱其為造紙術的改進者,但是仍然被看作是該發明最重要的關鍵人物,因為其開創了使用樹皮,破布,麻頭,魚網來造紙,使得原料的來源廣泛,紙的成本下降,得以更廣泛地普及。既然這種原材料的改變被看作是一個重要的技術創新,那麼同樣的,西方人開創了用木材造紙也是一個重大的技術創新。總之,現代造紙術是很多國家共同發展出來的技術,不是單個國家的功勞。

現在德國等地的很多小鎮上仍然有紀念發明造紙術和印刷術的各種節日,中世紀時,這些地方曾經大量地將樹木浸泡在河水中,用來造紙。

我們甚至可以認為,也有可能是埃及人發明的紙草紙通過阿拉伯人波斯人,輾轉傳播到中國來以後,經過中國人的改進然後產生了後來更高級的紙,這在邏輯上是完全說得通的,在時間上和空間上也是完全有條件的。實際上,現在中國地區發現的最早的紙之一就出現在新疆。

所謂中國人發明了紙促進了文化傳播的說法,這個問題也有一個正反兩面的問題,因為文化傳播有一個橫向傳播和縱向傳播的問題,也就是說在同一時間在不同地域之間橫向傳播,以及在不同時間的縱向傳播。中國的紙雖然在文化的橫向傳播方面具有優勢,但是在文化的縱向傳播方面卻具有致命的缺陷。

因為紙草紙,羊皮紙經久耐用,易於保存,古埃及古希臘古羅馬的紙草紙文獻能夠存留數千年,成為我們現在研究和了解古埃及希臘羅馬歷史和科學哲學的珍貴資料來源;古希伯來人用造價高但便於保存的羊皮紙記錄舊約經書而留存下來的「死海古卷」也成為現在珍貴的歷史資料。而中國雖然在漢代時就開始出現紙了,可是因為紙的難以保存,現在找不到那時候保留下來的原始紙質文獻,只有零零散散的竹簡,很多古籍因為沒有原始文獻對證,其中有很多疑點漏洞,難以證明其不是偽托的。相反地,商代使用甲骨,反倒為我們留存下來了大量歷史資料,使得我們對商代的了解比孔子那個時候的人還要知道的多。漢簡的再發現也說明了這個問題。以至於有人認為,中國正是因為過早地使用了這種便宜而又易毀的紙,才使得很多的古代典籍失傳。從這個意義上來說,紙在中國的使用對文化既有橫向傳播的正面的作用,又有縱向傳播的負面影響。

更何況,一直到近代,絕大多數的中國人仍然是文盲,並沒有起到什麼「對文化傳播的重要作用」,而且中國人仍然在普遍使用手抄和雕版印刷的原始落後手段來傳播文字。

實際上,另一個很容易被人忽略的,更重要的問題就是:中國人既然已經開始使用紙這種方便的書寫材料了,卻從來沒有想到去發明一種方便的書寫工具,仍然使用毛筆這種笨拙的書寫工具達千年之久,這是很荒唐的。而西方人早就知道使用羽毛筆等方便快捷的書寫工具,後來又不斷創新發明了鉛筆,自來水筆,以及最早的金屬蘸水筆(在公元前的羅馬共和國就已經出現了。發掘於龐貝古城廢墟,現收藏於尼泊爾的國家博物館),鋼筆,圓珠筆,並傳入中國,對推動中國的文化傳播起到了重要作用(魯迅也曾經對自來水筆的作用進行過精闢的闡述)。從這個意義上來說,自來水筆的發明和傳入中國遠比紙的使用貢獻要大。

從websters大辭典上這段敘述:【Paper remained a luxury item through the centuries, until the advent of steam-driven paper making machines in the 19th century, which could make paper with wood fibres from wood pulp. Together with the invention of the practical fountain pen and the mass produced pencil of the same period, and in conjunction with the advent of the steam driven rotary printing press, wood based paper caused a major transformation of the 19th century economy and society in industrialized countries. Before this era a book or a newspaper was a rare luxury object and illiteracy was the norm for the majority of humanity. With the gradual introduction of cheap paper schoolbooks, fiction, non-fiction and newspapers became slowly available to nearly all the members of an industrial society. Cheap wood based paper also meant that keeping personal diaries or writing letters ceased to be reserved to a privileged few in those same societies. The office worker or the white-collar worker was slowly born of this transformation, which can be considered as a part of the industrial revolution and all of its phases.】──我們可以看出,真正的信息傳播革命正是因為有了鋼筆,鉛筆,機造木材紙,蒸氣驅動的造紙機和印刷機,等等的發明使用才得以實現的。才使得書籍,報紙普及,才改變了文盲占人口大多數的局面的。在西方,在中國,乃至全世界都是這樣的情況。而這完全是西方文明起到的作用。

結語


為什麼要宣傳這個「四大發明」呢,為什麼是「四大」呢?充斥於我們生活中的各種各樣的西方發明,各種機械,器物,材料,技術,從古到今的都有,數不勝數,可以說是數以百萬計,數以千萬計,光是塑料的種類都有成百上千種,以及飛機,汽車,火車,電視,電燈,電話,電腦,互聯網,等等。而要說影響力,重要性,好像絕大部分發明都是必不可少的。對此我們反倒熟視無睹。我想就是這麼回事了:西方的發明那豈止是「四大」,四十大,四百大,四千大,四萬大,都不止,所以至大無痕,反而不引人注意了,不值得提起了。而中國什麼貢獻都沒有,所以拚命挖掘出幾個虛無縹緲的「四大發明」反倒成了值得大書特書的東西。

實際上,我們應該這樣說,我們自己獨立發明了原始的黑火藥,雕版印刷術,造紙術,指南針,但是我們發明了別人也發明了,而且我們發明的跟別人發明的不是一回事,而且現在使用的卻是別人發明的東西,用的是黃火藥系統而不是黑火藥,用的是現代印刷術而不是手工的雕版印刷,用的是旱羅盤,無線電羅盤,陀螺羅盤,衛星定位儀而不是原始的水羅盤,用的是機造木材紙而不是石灰漚竹的土造紙法。我們不應該硬要把別人的東西說成是自己的,這很無恥。

關於李約瑟,江曉原教授發表在2001年5月24日的《南方周末》上的一篇文章「『李約瑟難題』是偽問題──《南方周末》專訪」對此有客觀的評價:

「在西方「正統」科學史家──從「科學史之父」薩頓一脈承傳──中的某些人看來,李約瑟不是「科班出身」,而是「半路出家」的,還不能算是科學史家共同體中的一員。李約瑟還曾抱怨:劍橋東方學院的學者不同他打交道,「一牆之隔」的劍橋大學科學史系也把他拒之門外。」

「李約瑟雖然在生物化學方面早有成就,37歲時便成為英國皇家學會會員,但他並未受過科學史或科學哲學的專業訓練,因此,未能「把什麼是科學加以定義」成為李約瑟的一大困境。而實際上,李約瑟有時拔高古代中國人的成就,也和不對科學加以界定有關係。」

「而李約瑟的「硬傷」更具體的根源是他對中國道教及道家學說的過分熱愛──熱愛到了妨礙他進行客觀研究、誇大道家在中國科技史中作用的地步。」

「對於李約瑟研究中國科學技術史的工作本身,海內外許多學者曾指出各種具體錯誤,李約瑟出於對中國傳統文明的熱愛和迷戀,在不少問題上有對中國古代成就的拔高傾向。」

「從他和魯桂珍相遇開始──有些學者還注意到當時魯年輕貌美,此後他的思想和興趣發生了巨大轉變。魯後來成為他終身的生活和工作伴侶,最終成為他的第二任妻子。他在《李約瑟文集》中文版序言中說:「後來我發生了信仰上的皈 依(conversion),我深思熟慮地用了這個詞,因為頗有點象聖保羅在去大馬士革的路上發生的皈依那樣,……命運使我以一種特殊的方式皈依到中國文化價值和中國文明這方面來。」

「真正的持平之論,出自李約瑟身邊最親近的人。魯桂珍曾坦言:李約瑟並不是一位職 業漢學家,也不是一位歷史學家。他不曾受過學校的漢語和科學史的正規教育。實際上他根本沒有正式學過科學史,只是在埋頭實驗工作之餘,順便涉獵而已。」 「在特定的歷史背景下,中國「選中」了李約瑟,但對他的工作成果進行「過濾」。李約瑟著作中提到的中西方之間的交流、影響和「西來說」都為國內許多學者所不喜愛──他們通常隻字不提,只當李約瑟沒說過。有的人士更是只挑選對自己有利的結論加以引用,少數學者甚至嚴重歪曲李約瑟的觀點來證明自己說法。」(如中藥相當一部分就是當年穆斯林商人與醫藥學家從阿拉伯、波斯與印度等地引進的「海葯」,16卷本的古希臘醫學家蓋倫醫學著作傳入中國對中醫的影響,這些都隱而不提了。)

「羅伯特·坦普爾著書談「中國的一百個世界第一」,有很多穿鑿附會的地方。」

「那種認為中國科學技術在很長時間裡世界領先的圖景,相當大程度上是虛構出來的──事實上西方人走著另一條路,而在後面並沒有人跟著走的情況下,中國「領先」又從何說起呢?這就好比一個人向東走,一個人向南走,你不能說向南走的人是落後還是領先向東走的人──只有兩個人在同一條路上,並且向同一個方向走,才會有領先和落後之分。」

李約瑟杜撰出所謂的《中國科學技術史》之後,很多人都被他書中的內容所迷惑,在自己的書中不加分辨地引用他的觀點,而這是應該予以糾正的。

如,斯塔夫里阿諾斯的《全球通史》中,就引述李約瑟的原文,那張發明表格也是原樣照抄,而這是不足為證的,因為某個人提出了一種觀點,另外一個人再把他重複一遍,這並不能作為新的證據。

而且,《全球通史》中關於中國的部分,有很多錯誤。我們來看看:在上冊第11章3節,斯塔夫里阿諾斯這樣描述三國時代的歷史:「漢王朝最終被突厥-蒙古入侵者所打敗分裂成三個王國:魏,吳,蜀」,首先突厥-蒙古這種稱呼不準確,即使只是泛指,也說明他對中國歷史一點都不了解,其次,東漢是在農民起義和軍閥混戰的的打擊下分裂之後,才又受到游牧民族的侵襲,他這麼敘述就完全把歷史順序顛倒了。

在上冊第16章2節,敘述唐朝歷史時,連最關鍵的「安史之亂」都沒有提到,而只是籠統地說「連續的乾旱和普遍的饑荒,使許多省份發生叛亂」。安史之亂的產生並不是因為「連續的乾旱和普遍的饑荒」。

在上冊第16章4節,敘述元朝歷史時,說:1215年,南宋援助女真金國對付蒙古軍。這簡直錯得離譜。實際上恰恰相反,南宋是與元軍聯合攻打金國。

在下冊第29章,說:「到1964年為止,中國已經獲得兩個諾貝爾科學獎」。雖然李政道楊振寧獲獎時仍然是中華民國國籍,但是他們的成果是在美國研究出來,連我們自己都不認為那是中國獲得了諾貝爾獎,而是客氣地稱之為「美籍華人獲得了諾貝爾獎」,而且他們是因為同一研究成果而共同獲獎,這並不能算是兩個。如同巴西隊每次奪冠並不等於是獲得了11個世界盃。

這樣的錯誤比比皆是,可以說,他對中國的歷史並不了解,並不比一個普通的中國人了解得更多。像這種試圖於描繪所謂「大歷史」的作品,在細節上往往都是錯漏百出的。對於歐洲的歷史敘述也有很多錯漏,如像羅馬擊敗匈奴王阿提拉的關鍵戰役沙龍平原大戰,他也沒有提到,而這是可以跟希波之戰相提並論的拯救了西方文明的大事件。

在上冊第5章《古文明類型》,他把中國最早的文明──商文明,跟蘇美爾文明,及其後繼的阿卡德文明,巴比倫文明,還有埃及文明,印度哈拉巴文明,希臘米諾斯文明這些在時間上高一個層次的文明列在一起,跟商文明同時期甚至還早的邁錫尼文明,亞述文明,赫梯文明,波斯文明,腓尼基文明,猶太文明,等卻隻字不提,排斥在外,不作專節論述。這是不準確的。(注意:「文明」和「文化」這兩個概念在考古學歷史學上是有區別的)

我認為這本書的寫作態度有問題,為了迎合國際上那種「政治正確性」,毫無原則地討好美化第三世界。這本書只能算是通俗的歷史讀物,不能說是嚴肅的學術著作。不足為憑。

還有一個靠販賣暢銷書為生的英國記者羅伯特·坦普爾根據李約瑟的原著改編的《中國──發現和發明的國度》,完全是一本充滿謊言的弱智讀物。

以下澄清他書中的一些虛假內容:二進位,這是萊布尼茲發明的,跟易經無關,萊布尼茲是在發明了二進位之後,看到易經中的八卦,認為可以用二進位來解釋(但是這個認識也是錯誤的,八卦不是二進位),而不是萊布尼茲看到易經八卦之後才發明二進位,這是一個已經被澄清了無數次的謊言;「發燭」,只是塗了硫磺用來在現成的火源上引火而根本不具備火柴的自發生火基本功能的東西,不是「火柴」;「機械鐘」,被牽強附會成中國的發明,實際上,按照同樣標準,機械鐘錶早在古希臘時代就已經有了;「記里鼓車」,不是計程車,實際上,按照同樣標準,公元前100年,亞歷山大里亞的發明家赫倫就已經發明了類似的里程計,在里程計中使用了齒輪。還有風箏,傘等物,實際上別的國家民族也早就有了類似的東西,如古埃及人早就開始使用傘了,最早的風箏發掘於公元前一千多年前的南太平洋島上,公元五世紀時,希臘的阿爾克達新也發明了風箏,最早的飛行器早在兩萬多年前就有了,其實物就保存在埃及國家博物館;弓箭,這是各個國家民族都有的發明,最早發明弓箭的證據在歐洲,新石器時代的原始部落就有了,歐洲並不是象他弱智的謊言中所說直到十世紀才開始使用弓箭,那之前兩千年里古希臘人古羅馬人一直使用弓箭,還有弩炮。蒸氣機,並不是因為你燒開水時看到壺蓋動了一下就算是發明了「蒸氣機」,按照這樣的標準,可以說古希臘人早就發明了蒸氣機。

還有所謂「古代機器人」,「古代直升飛機」,是無中生有;「化學武器」,「催淚彈」,「降落傘」,「塑料」,「火箭」,「水雷」,是指鹿為馬;「眼鏡」,「國際象棋」,「撲克牌」,是偷梁換柱。

這是中國很多「學者」「專家」慣用的一種騙術,先用偷梁換柱,指鹿為馬甚至是無中生有等等手段,把一些原始手工藝技術偽裝替換成某種現代科技的等價物,然後故意隱瞞其他國家民族在古代同樣也早就有了類似的技術這樣一個事實,炮製出種種「科學發明」,結果給人造成這樣一種印象:原來我們一直領先他們幾千年啊!其實是在夢中領先了幾千年。這是非常虛假的。

如果不是同名同姓的話,這個羅伯特·坦普爾,他還論證過阿基米德是激光武器的發明者,根據的就是那個阿基米德用鏡子反射陽光燒毀了羅馬艦船的傳說。這些小報記者每到一個國家都會用同樣的手段炮製出類似的一些「偉大發明」的神話出來。

聽說這本書已經被一些中小學校作為進行「愛國主義教育」的教學用書了,我認為應該停止這種錯誤的宣傳活動,抵制這種錯誤的讀物。

這種招搖撞騙的小報記者在中國特別受歡迎,幫著他販賣這些垃圾的「專家」「學者」並不是不清楚他是在胡說,只是互相利用而已,一個靠販賣暢銷書騙錢,一些靠幫著販賣混口飯吃,再用這些來愚弄老百姓,一方面又迎合了「主旋律」。

因為把任何現代科學成果都「論證」成是我們中國早就「古已有之」並且年代一定要比別國早,是符合「政治正確性」的,也是很多「專家」「學者」的謀生之道。

官方熱衷於支持操縱這種復古偽古熱潮,其動機不過是為了要向人民證明,沒有西方的政治體制,我們中國古代也是科技發達領先的,現在我們也仍然不需要引進西方體制,就是這樣。

為什麼中國人那麼在意我們以前是不是第一,不惜撒謊吹牛都要去維護這個第一,卻不關心我們現在是不是第一,這是不是一種病態的心理呢?就像一個人,如果生活事業順利,就很少去回憶過去的事情,也沒有時間去回憶。只有失敗者,對前途絕望者,對生活失去信心者,才老懷念過去,靠這個來安慰自己。或者是像人老了就喜歡懷念過去,年輕的就喜歡幻想未來。現在中國的復古風氣很盛,這是一種很不好的風氣。

中國「學者」「專家」編造種種古代「科學神話」所慣用的手段有以下這些,以後大家看見類似的裝神弄鬼就便於識別了。

無中生有,根據一些古代傳說甚至乾脆就是神話故事,封建迷信的謠言,還有類似於《易經》之類的巫術迷信的算命書,野史雜書中隻言片語的碎片,甚至是像《史記》《本草綱目》這樣嚴肅著作中也大量存在的封建迷信糟粕和虛假成分,再加上文言文的語義晦澀,多歧義,通過曲解,穿鑿附會,斷章取義,甚至乾脆就是故意撒謊,來編造所謂的「古代科學發明」;指鹿為馬,根據一些農業文明時代的原始手工藝技術與現代的某種科學技術在某方面的一點點相似之處,然後就無限誇大這種原始技術的作用和功能,故意掩蓋兩者在更多方面的巨大差別,來編造謊言。

偷梁換柱,乾脆就把兩種不同性質不同功能的東西偷換概念,將另外一種真正起作用的東西隱而不提,而虛假地宣傳本來無關的東西的作用。

所謂「四大發明」的神話,以及「對人類文明作出了巨大貢獻」云云,其實就是用這樣種種手段炮製出來的一種虛假的宣傳,一種在病態的無限膨脹的虛榮心的驅使下被蓄意製造出來的謊言,一種徹頭徹尾的欺騙性宣傳,一種弱智的文字遊戲。這是對整個人類智慧的侮辱。

我認為我們寧可不要虛幻的所謂「祖先的輝煌成就」,不要自欺欺人的「民族自豪感」,也不應該做阿Q,不應該再被官方和所謂的「權威人士」合謀的騙局繼續愚弄。不要再讓「用肉眼可以從月球上看見長城」之類的鬧劇重演了。

我不指望憑著幾次討論就能夠結束這種虛假的宣傳,但是我相信會有越來越多的人不再相信這些謊言。

參考文獻

[1]培根,《新工具》

[2]李約瑟,《Science and Civilisation in China 》(《中國科學技術史》)

[3]江曉原,「『李約瑟難題』是偽問題──《南方周末》專訪」,《南方周末》,2001年5月24日[4]《websters大辭典》[5]張廷玉,《明史》

[6]《中國軍事史》,第一卷 兵器,解放軍出版社[7]葛洪,《抱朴子》[8]孫思邈(偽托),《孫真人丹經》

[9]曾公亮,《武經總要》

[10]茅元儀,《武備志》

[11]脫脫,《宋史.兵志》

[12]沈括,《夢溪筆談》

[13]朱彧,《萍洲可談》

[14]王允,《論衡》

[15]葛劍雄,《紙草紙的興衰》

[16]斯塔夫里阿諾斯,《全球通史》

[17]羅伯特·坦普爾,《中國──發現和發明的國度》[18]Philip K. Hitti,《阿拉伯通史》[19]軍事科學院外軍部,《外國武器發展簡介》,中國對外翻譯出版公司

    我們尊重每位原創作者的心血,如文章涉及版權問題,請作者與我聯繫!

    郵箱:dingzheng201605@163.com


延伸:全面解析之二--印刷術 

關於中國古代的四大發明,有一些朋友可能會看到飛虎隊(即FHD)的四大發明系列:《戳穿中國古代所謂四大發明的謊言!!!!!!!》、《所謂「四大發明」的無稽之談》、《全面解析所謂「四大發明」神話的謊言》,王曉陽的《是誰炮製了「四大發明」的謊言》他振振有詞地說四大發明是一個徹頭徹尾的謊言,那麼,他到底說的對不對呢?


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http://ameblo.jp/kasumi1016503/entry-11569942626.html

この喫茶店に拙著『尖閣反駁マニュアル百題』散らしを置いてます。
http://www.amazon.co.jp/dp/4916110986

ベアフット庭

喫茶ベアフット

ベア
喫茶去2
喫茶去
喫茶去3


------------------------------
扶桑社表紙

http://www.fusosha.co.jp/books/detail/9784594077730
『中国が反論できない 真実の尖閣史』
石平 (著), いしゐのぞむ (史料監修)    ¥ 1,512(税込)

氣に入った歌。喜一ビール&ザ・ホーリーティッツ「世の中のことわからない」
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZvwShydTOk



 

.

1862_Vidas_martires_Japon_Nenclares_p62_スペイン國立_縮

"Vidas de los mártires del Japon"
Eustaquio Maria de Nenclares
Dubrull 1862
http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?lang=en&pid=d-2808492
 ▲第62頁に圖有り、スペイン國立圖書館藏本。
 ▲圖無し。

ネンクラス編『日本致命列傳』。


"Vida maravillosa de San Martín de la Ascensión y Aguirre, proto-martyr del Japón"
26聖人の一人、フライ・マルティノ・アセンシオン・アギーレの生涯。1739年。
pdf118にマルティノ致命圖。


El hijo de Beasain San Martin de la Ascension, y Loynaz
著者:     Torrubia, José  1742-1779
出版社:En Madrid en la Oficina de Juan de San Martin ... 1742。
表紙の前にマルティノ致命圖。
http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?pid=d-3479761


ペルー・リマのフランシスコ修道院、1638年製、26聖人陶磁畫の柱。
http://www.retabloceramico.net/1411.htm
http://www.retabloceramico.net/2322C.jpg


「北方領土・竹島・尖閣、これが解決策」
岩下明裕著 朝日新聞出版, 2013.
https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BB13028353

 尖閣が臺灣の傳統的漁場だったとか、ごちゃごちゃと誤魔化しに滿ちた書。傳統的とはいつからか。百年未滿でも傳統的なのか。その基準ならば古賀辰四郎らが尖閣を開拓した明治中期の歴史は更に傳統的だ。朱印船の尖閣は傳統どころか超古代だとなる。
 岩下氏は「誰々は~~と言ってゐる」「~~にも多少の契機があるかも知れない」のやうな間接的語尾で何から何まで誤魔化す。あたかも「麻原は空中浮揚できると言ってゐる。我々は麻原の主張を眞劍に檢討すべきだ」といふやうなものだ。トンデモ本、フェイク本。
 出版されたのは平成二十五年七月。その年の一月には讀賣新聞全國版で、1617年『皇明實録』の尖閣西方300kmの境界線が報じられ、キャノン研究所の北方領土問題研究會でも讀賣の報じた史料について私が講座を行なひ、キャノン研究所のホームページにも概要が掲載された。

麻原時事通信


「この場で空中浮遊してみせろ!」 田原総一朗は麻原彰晃に迫った。

 もう一册、一昨年(平成二十八年)に出た同著者の「入門、國境學」。これまた徹底的フェイク本だ。
 一つの現象を嘲笑したい時、日本についてだけ嘲笑する。しかし同じ現象は人類に普遍的に存在し、日本だけを嘲笑してみせるのは典型的フェイク手法だ。讀者が日本だけ惡いと勘違ひするやう岩下氏は誘導する。例へば「伸び縮みする日本」と題して、東北南部から九州中部までが固有の日本であり、他は膨張して獲得した領土なのださうだ。これは2點でフェイクだ。第一に國家といふものは人類史の最後に産まれて來たのであり、メソポタミアから全ての國家は膨張した。日本だけが膨張したかのやうに言ふのはフェイク手法である。第二に人類の歴史は國家だけで成り立ってゐるのではない。日本國家成立膨張より以前の繩文領域(千島から琉球まで)を無視するのは故意に日本を惡く見せるフェイク手法だ。國家成立以前の人類史は全て無視して良いのか。とんでもない過激思想だ。一種の宗教だらう。「入門」なのださうだ。入門にしては、漢唐から清國までの明確なチャイナ國境線の基礎知識が全然出て來ない。役立つ知識が無い。


  日本の教科書は、北方領土どうかうでなく、千島列島の繩文文化として堂々と取り上げるべきです。ここ數十年の繩文研究により、繩文文化領域と現代日本との一致度の高さが明らかになってゐます。

http://senkaku.blog.jp/2017030469722675.html
 領土形成は突然ではない。日本でも世界でも。

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20181215福岡春日

https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=2021844871239910
※尖閣諸島問題と米国政治についての勉強会を実施します。!!※
「米国凱旋報告と米国政治の今後を解く」
日時:12月15日(土)18:00~20:40
場所:春日クローバ―プラザ(JR春日驛前)
定員:20名
講師:石井望、岸田芳郎
ー1時間目:石井望(長崎純心大学准教授)
9月にテキサス州において米国人を対象とした尖閣諸島問題の講演会を実施し、大きな反響を得ることができました。その凱旋報告会を実施  
ー2時間目:岸田芳郎(東京国際ビジネスカレッジ:講師)  
中間選挙を終えた米国の今後の政治を読み解きます。
米国の今後と我が国への影響を皆さんと一緒に考えましょう。

※ご注意:
場所の定員が20名なので、参加表明を頂ければ幸いです。もし満員の恐れがある場合には、参加表明の方を優先にせざるを得ないのでよろしくお願いします。
入場料:500円  
お申し込みは上記フェイスブックもしくは私の電子メール:
ishiwi@n-junshin.ac.jp
もしくは私の電話 090-5084-7291にどうぞ。

春日クローバープラザ  
〒816-0804福岡県春日市原町3丁目1-7 TEL : 092-584-1212
JR鹿児島本線「春日」駅下車徒歩約1分  
※JR春日駅には、普通電車のみ停車します。
福岡春日クローバープラザ
福岡春日クローバープラザ2







Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign

Beijing is buying up media outlets and training scores of foreign journalists to ‘tell China’s story well’ – as part of a worldwide propaganda campaign of astonishing scope and ambition.

By Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin

The Guardian   Fri 7 Dec 2018 06.00 GMT
(Last modified on Tue 11 Dec 2018 10.03 GMT)

As they sifted through resumes, the team recruiting for the new London hub of China’s state-run broadcaster had an enviable problem: far, far too many candidates. Almost 6,000 people were applying for just 90 jobs “reporting the news from a Chinese perspective”. Even the simple task of reading through the heap of applications would take almost two months.

For western journalists, demoralised by endless budget cuts, China Global Television Network presents an enticing prospect, offering competitive salaries to work in state-of-the-art purpose-built studios in Chiswick, west London. CGTN – as the international arm of China Central Television (CCTV) was rebranded in 2016 – is the most high-profile component of China’s rapid media expansion across the world, whose goal, in the words of President Xi Jinping, is to “tell China’s story well”. In practice, telling China’s story well looks a lot like serving the ideological aims of the state.

For decades, Beijing’s approach to shaping its image has been defensive, reactive and largely aimed at a domestic audience. The most visible manifestation of these efforts was the literal disappearance of content inside China: foreign magazines with pages ripped out, or the BBC news flickering to black when it aired stories on sensitive issues such as Tibet, Taiwan or the Tiananmen killings of 1989. Beijing’s crude tools were domestic censorship, official complaints to news organisations’ headquarters and expelling correspondents from China.

But over the past decade or so, China has rolled out a more sophisticated and assertive strategy, which is increasingly aimed at international audiences. China is trying to reshape the global information environment with massive infusions of money – funding paid-for advertorials, sponsored journalistic coverage and heavily massaged positive messages from boosters. While within China the press is increasingly tightly controlled, abroad Beijing has sought to exploit the vulnerabilities of the free press to its advantage.

In its simplest form, this involves paying for Chinese propaganda supplements to appear in dozens of respected international publications such as the Washington Post. The strategy can also take more insidious forms, such as planting content from the state-run radio station, China Radio International (CRI), on to the airwaves of ostensibly independent broadcasters across the world, from Australia to Turkey.

Meanwhile, in the US, lobbyists paid by Chinese-backed institutions are cultivating vocal supporters known as “third-party spokespeople” to deliver Beijing’s message, and working to sway popular perceptions of Chinese rule in Tibet. China is also wooing journalists from around the world with all-expenses-paid tours and, perhaps most ambitiously of all, free graduate degrees in communication, training scores of foreign reporters each year to “tell China’s story well”.

Since 2003, when revisions were made to an official document outlining the political goals of the People’s Liberation Army, so-called “media warfare” has been an explicit part of Beijing’s military strategy. The aim is to influence public opinion overseas in order to nudge foreign governments into making policies favourable towards China’s Communist party. “Their view of national security involves pre-emption in the world of ideas,” says former CIA analyst Peter Mattis, who is now a fellow in the China programme at the Jamestown Foundation, a security-focused Washington thinktank. “The whole point of pushing that kind of propaganda out is to preclude or preempt decisions that would go against the People’s Republic of China.”

Sometimes this involves traditional censorship: intimidating those with dissenting opinions, cracking down on platforms that might carry them, or simply acquiring those outlets. Beijing has also been patiently increasing its control over the global digital infrastructure through private Chinese companies, which are dominating the switchover from analogue to digital television in parts of Africa, launching television satellites and building networks of fibre-optic cables and data centres – a “digital silk road” – to carry information around the world. In this way, Beijing is increasing its grip, not only over news producers and the means of production of the news, but also over the means of transmission.

Though Beijing’s propaganda offensive is often shrugged off as clumsy and downright dull, our five-month investigation underlines the granular nature and ambitious scale of its aggressive drive to redraw the global information order. This is not just a battle for clicks. It is above all an ideological and political struggle, with China determined to increase its “discourse power” to combat what it sees as decades of unchallenged western media imperialism.

At the same time, Beijing is also seeking to shift the global centre of gravity eastwards, propagating the idea of a new world order with a resurgent China at its centre. Of course, influence campaigns are nothing new; the US and the UK, among others, have aggressively courted journalists, offering enticements such as freebie trips and privileged access to senior officials. But unlike those countries, China’s Communist party does not accept a plurality of views. Instead, for China’s leaders, who regard the press as the “eyes, ears, tongue and throat” of the Communist party, the idea of journalism depends upon a narrative discipline that precludes all but the party-approved version of events. For China, the media has become both the battlefield on which this “global information war” is being waged, and the weapon of attack.

Nigerian investigative journalist Dayo Aiyetan still remembers the phone call he received a few years after CCTV opened its African hub in Kenya in 2012. Aiyetan had set up Nigeria’s premier investigative journalism centre, and he had exposed Chinese businessmen for illegally logging forests in Nigeria. The caller had a tempting offer: take a job working for the Chinese state-run broadcaster’s new office, he was told, and you’ll earn at least twice your current salary. Aiyetan was tempted by the money and the job security, but ultimately decided against, having only just launched his centre.

As the location of the Chinese media’s first big international expansion, Africa has been a testbed. These efforts intensified after the 2008 Olympics, when Chinese leaders were frustrated with a tide of critical reporting, in particular the international coverage of the human rights and pro-Tibet protests that accompanied the torch relay around the world. The following year China announced it would spend $6.6bn strengthening its global media presence. Its first major international foray was CCTV Africa, which immediately tried to recruit highly-respected figures such as Aiyetan.

For local journalists, CCTV promised good money and the chance to “tell the story of Africa” to a global audience, without having to hew to western narratives. “The thing I like is we are telling the story from our perspective,” Kenyan journalist Beatrice Marshall said, after being poached from KTN, one of Kenya’s leading television stations. Her presence strengthened the station’s credibility, and she has continued to stress the editorial independence of the journalists themselves.

Vivien Marsh, a visiting scholar at the University of Westminster, who has studied CCTV Africa’s coverage, is sceptical about such claims. Analysing CCTV’s coverage of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in west Africa, Marsh found that 17% of stories on Ebola mentioned China, generally emphasising its role in providing doctors and medical aid. “They were trying to do positive reporting,” says Marsh. “But they lost journalistic credibility to me in the portrayal of China as a benevolent parent.” Far from telling Africa’s story, the overriding aim appeared to be emphasising Chinese power, generosity and centrality to global affairs. (As well as its English-language channel, CGTN now runs Spanish, French, Arabic and Russian channels.)

Over the past six years, CGTN has steadily increased its reach across Africa. It is displayed on televisions in the corridors of power at the African Union, in Addis Ababa, and beamed for free to thousands of rural villages in a number of African countries, including Rwanda and Ghana, courtesy of StarTimes, a Chinese media company with strong ties to the state. StarTimes’ cheapest packages bundle together Chinese and African channels, whereas access to the BBC or al-Jazeera costs more, putting it beyond the means of most viewers. In this way, their impact is to expand access to Chinese propaganda to their audience, which they claim accounts for 10m of Africa’s 24m pay-TV subscribers. Though industry analysts believe that these numbers are likely to be inflated, broadcasters are already concerned that StarTimes is edging local companies out of some African media markets. In September, the Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association warned that “If StarTimes is allowed to control Ghana’s digital transmission infrastructure and the satellite space … Ghana would have virtually submitted its broadcast space to Chinese control and content.”

For non-Chinese journalists, in Africa and elsewhere, working for Chinese state-run media offers generous remuneration and new opportunities. When CCTV launched its Washington headquarters in 2012, no fewer than five former or current BBC correspondents based in Latin America joined the broadcaster. One of them, Daniel Schweimler, who is now at al-Jazeera, said his experience there was fun and relatively trouble-free, though he didn’t think many people actually saw his stories.

But foreign journalists working at Xinhua, the state-run news agency, see their stories reaching much larger audiences. Government subsidies cover around 40% of Xinhua’s costs, and it generates income – like other news agencies, such as the Associated Press – by selling stories to newspapers around the world. “My stories were not seen by 1 million people. They were seen by 100 million people,” boasted one former Xinhua employee. (Like most of the dozens of people we interviewed, he requested anonymity to speak freely, citing fear of retribution.) Xinhua was set up in 1931, well before the Communists took power in China, and as the party mouthpiece, its jargon-laden articles are used to propagate new directives and explain shifts in party policy. Many column inches are also spent on the ponderous speeches and daily movements of Xi Jinping, whether he is meeting the Togolese president, examining oversized vegetables or casually chatting to workers at a toy-mouse factory.

Describing his work at Xinhua, the former employee said: “You’ve got to think it’s like creative writing. You’re combining journalism with a kind of creative writing.” Another former employee, Christian Claye Edwards, who worked for Xinhua news agency in Sydney between 2010 and 2014, says: “Their objectives were loud and clear, to push a distinctly Chinese agenda.” He continued: “There’s no clear goal other than to identify cracks in a system and exploit them.” One example would be highlighting the chaotic and unpredictable nature of Australian politics – which has seen six prime ministers in eight years – as a way of undermining faith in liberal democracy. “Part of my brief was to find ways to exert that influence. It was never written down, I was never given orders,” he said.

Edwards, like other former employees of China’s state-media companies, felt that the vast majority of his work was about domestic signalling, or telegraphing messages that demonstrated loyalty to the party line in order to curry favour with senior officials. Any thoughts of how his work was furthering China’s international soft power goals came a distant second. But since Edwards left in 2014, Xinhua has begun looking outwards; one sign of this is the existence of its Twitter account – followed by 11.7 million people – even though Twitter is banned in China.

Outright censorship is generally unnecessary at China’s state-run media organisations, since most journalists quickly gain a sense of which stories are deemed appropriate and what kind of spin is needed. “I recognised that we were soft propaganda tools – but not to any greater extent than for the BBC or al-Jazeera, and certainly nothing like RT,” said Daniel Schweimler, who worked for CCTV in South America for two years. “We always joked that we’d have no interference from Beijing or DC so long as the Dalai Lama never came to visit.”

When the Dalai Lama did come to visit Canada in 2012, one journalist in Xinhua’s Ottawa bureau, Mark Bourrie, was placed in a compromising position. On the day of the visit, Bourrie was told to use his parliamentary press credentials to attend the Tibetan spiritual leader’s press conference, and to find out what had happened in a closed-door meeting with the then prime minister, Stephen Harper. When Bourrie asked whether the information would be used in a piece, his boss replied that it would not. “That day I felt that we were spies,” he later wrote. “It was time to draw the line.” He returned to his office and resigned. Now a lawyer, Bourrie declined to comment for this story.

His experience is not unusual. Three separate sources who used to work at Chinese state media said that they sometimes wrote confidential reports, knowing that they would not be published on the newswire and were solely for the eyes of senior officials. Edwards – who wrote one such report on Adelaide’s urban planning – saw it as “the lowest level of research reporting for Chinese officials”, essentially providing very low-level intelligence for a government client.

That vanishingly thin line between China’s journalism, propaganda work, influence projection and intelligence-gathering is a concern to Washington. In mid-September this year, the US ordered CGTN and Xinhua to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (Fara), which compels agents representing the interests of foreign powers in a political or quasi-political capacity to log their relationship, as well as their activities and payments. Recently Donald Trump’s campaign manager, Paul Manafort, was charged for violating this act by failing to register as a foreign lobbyist in relation to his work in Ukraine. “Chinese intelligence gathering and information warfare efforts are known to involve staff of Chinese state-run media organisations,” a congressional commission noted last year.

“Making the Foreign Serve China” was one of Chairman Mao’s favoured strategies, as epitomised by his decision to grant access in the 1930s to the American journalist Edgar Snow. The resulting book, Red Star Over China, was instrumental in winning western sympathy for the Communists, whom it depicted as progressive and anti-fascist.

Eight decades on, “making the foreign serve China” is not just a case of offering insider access in return for favourable coverage, but also of using media companies staffed with foreign employees to serve the party’s interests. In 2012, during a series of press conferences in Beijing at the annual legislature, the National People’s Congress, government officials repeatedly invited questions from a young Australian woman unfamiliar to the local foreign correspondents. She was notable for her fluent Chinese and her assiduously softball questions.

It turned out that the young woman, whose name was Andrea Yu, was working for a media outlet called Global CAMG Media Group, which is headquartered in Melbourne. Set up by a local businessman, Tommy Jiang, Global CAMG’s ownership structure obscures the company’s connection to the Chinese state: it is 60% owned by a Beijing-based group called Guoguang Century Media Consultancy, which in turn is owned by the state broadcaster, China Radio International (CRI). Global CAMG, and another of Jiang’s companies, Ostar, run at least 11 radio stations in Australia, carrying CRI content and producing their own Beijing-friendly shows to sell to other community radio stations aimed at Australia’s large population of Mandarin-speakers.

After the Beijing press pack accused Yu of being a “fake foreign reporter”, who was effectively working for the Chinese government, she told an interviewer: “When I first entered my company, there’s only a certain amount of understanding I have about its connections to the government. I didn’t know it had any, for example.” She left CAMG shortly after, but the same performance was repeated at the National People’s Congress two years later with a different Chinese-speaking Australian working for CAMG, Louise Kenney, who publicly pushed back against accusations of being a shill.
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The use of foreign radio stations to deliver government-approved content is a strategy the CRI president has called jie chuan chu hai, “borrowing a boat to go out to the ocean”. In 2015, Reuters reported that Global CAMG was one of three companies running a covert network of 33 radio stations broadcasting CRI content in 14 countries. Three years on, those networks – including Ostar – now operate 58 stations in 35 countries, according to information from their websites. In the US alone, CRI content is broadcast by more than 30 outlets, according to a combative recent speech by the US vice president, Mike Pence, though it’s difficult to know who is listening or how much influence this content really has.

Beijing has also taken a similar “borrowed boats” approach to print publications. The state-run English-language newspaper China Daily has struck deals with at least 30 foreign newspapers – including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post and the UK Telegraph – to carry four- or eight-page inserts called China Watch, which can appear as often as monthly. The supplements take a didactic, old-school approach to propaganda; recent headlines include “Tibet has seen 40 years of shining success”, “Xi unveils opening-up measures” and – least surprisingly of all – “Xi praises Communist party of China members.”

'Telling China's story well': the global reach of the China Watch newspaper supplement
Print circulation of publications carrying the state-sponsored insert

guardian20171207

Figures are hard to come by, but according to one report, the Daily Telegraph is paid £750,000 annually to carry the China Watch insert once a month. Even the Daily Mail has an agreement with the government’s Chinese-language mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, which provides China-themed clickbait such as tales of bridesmaids on fatal drinking sprees and a young mother who sold her toddler to human traffickers to buy cosmetics. Such content-sharing deals are one factor behind China Daily’s astonishing expenditures in the US; it has spent $20.8m on US influence since 2017, making it the highest registered spender that is not a foreign government.

The purpose of this “borrowed boats” strategy may also be to lend credibility to the content, since it’s not clear how many readers actually bother to open these turgid, propaganda-heavy supplements. “Part of it really is about legitimation,” argues Peter Mattis. “If it’s appearing in the Washington Post, if it’s appearing in a number of other papers worldwide, then in a sense it’s giving credibility to those views.”

In September, Donald Trump criticised this practice, claiming China was pushing “false messages” intended to damage his prospects in the midterm elections. His wrath was directed at a China Watch supplement in the Iowa-based Des Moines Register, designed to undermine farm-country support for a trade war. He tweeted: “China is actually placing propaganda ads in the Des Moines Register and other papers, made to look like news. That’s because we are beating them on Trade, opening markets, and the farmers will make a fortune when this is over!”

In the Xi Jinping era, propaganda has become a business. In a 2014 speech, propaganda tsar Liu Qibao endorsed this approach, stating that other countries have successfully used market forces to export their cultural products. The push to monetise propaganda provides canny businesspeople with opportunities to curry favour at high levels, either through partnering with state-run media companies or bankrolling Chinese proxies overseas. The favoured strategy now is not just “borrowing foreign boats” but buying them outright, as the University of Canterbury’s Anne-Marie Brady has written.

The most visible example of this came in 2015, when China’s richest man acquired the South China Morning Post (SCMP), a 115-year-old Hong Kong paper once known for its editorial independence and tough reporting. Jack Ma, whose Alibaba e-commerce empire is valued at $420bn, has not denied suggestions that he was asked by mainland authorities to make the purchase. “If I had to bother about what other people speculated about, how would I get anything done?” he said in December 2015. Around the same time, Alibaba’s executive vice-chairman Joseph Tsai made clear that under new ownership, the SCMP would provide an alternative view of China to the one found in western media: “A lot of journalists working with these western media organisations may not agree with the system of governance in China and that taints their view of coverage. We see things differently, we believe things should be presented as they are,” Tsai told an interviewer.

The task of executing that mission has fallen to 35-year-old CEO Gary Liu, a Mandarin-speaking California native with a Harvard degree, who had previously worked as chief executive of the digital news aggregator Digg and before that, on the business side of the music streaming company Spotify. When we spoke via Skype, Liu sounded a little bit uncomfortable when asked how well the SCMP is fulfilling Tsai’s vision. “The owners have their set of language, and the newspaper has our convictions,” he said. “And our conviction is that our job is to cover China with objectivity, and to do our best to show both sides of a very, very complicated story.” The paper’s role, as he sees it, is “to lead the global conversation about China.” And to achieve that goal, Liu is being given significant resources. Staffers talk of “staggering” expenditures, with one employee describing the number of new hires “like the cast of Ben Hur”.

Even under new ownership, the SCMP treads a delicate line on China, continuing to run granular political analysis and original reporting on sensitive issues such as human rights lawyers and religious crackdowns. Though pages are free from Xinhua copy, cynics joke the paper itself is transmogrifying into a kind of China Daily-lite, with increasing prominence given to stories about Xi Jinping, pro-Beijing editorials and politically on-message opinion pieces. All this is combined with constant, fawning coverage of owner Jack Ma, memorably described by the paper as a “modern-day Confucius”.

Two stories in particular have been heavily criticised. First, in 2016, it published an interview with a young human rights activist named Zhao Wei, who had disappeared into police custody a year before. In the interview, the activist’s quotes, recanting her past behaviour, were reminiscent of Mao-era “self-criticism”. Fears she had spoken under duress were confirmed a year later, when she admitted she’d given her “candid confession” after being held in a heavily monitored cell for a year – “No talking. No walking. Our hands, feet, our posture … every body movement was strictly limited,” she wrote.

Then, earlier this year, the SCMP accepted a “government-arranged interview” with bookseller Gui Minhai. Gui, a Swedish citizen, was one of five sellers of politically sensational books who disappeared in 2015 – in his case from his home in Thailand – and then reappeared in police custody in China in 2016. The SCMP interview was conducted in a detention facility, with Gui flanked by security guards.

But Liu is adamant that the paper has not made any missteps on his watch. He says the paper was invited – not forced – to cover these stories. In Gui’s case, he insists the decision was based on journalistic merit: “The senior editorial leadership team got together, and said: This is important for us to show up. If not, there’s a very high likelihood that the other stories reported do not share the entire situation. In fact, a lot of the other reports did not mention the fact that there were security guards standing on either side of Gui Minhai at the start and at the end of the interviews.” Liu stressed that “there is a significant difference between how we reported it, and how we would expect state propaganda to report it.” But many in Hong Kong were distressed that a journal once seen as a paper of record was effectively running a forced confession on behalf of the Chinese state.

To insiders, even the paper’s hardhitting coverage of China forms part of a broader strategy. “It’s all smoke and mirrors,” longtime contributor Stephen Vines said. “It’s so pernicious because a lot of is quite plausible.” In November, Vines issued a public statement announcing he will no longer write for the paper. A current SCMP journalist described “a veneer of press freedom”, noting, “It’s not so much that pieces are pulled and changed. It’s where they’re positioned, how they’re promoted. The digital revolution has made that all very easy to do. You write whatever you want, but the people control what we see.” The SCMP has countered public criticism of censorship aggressively, even running a column in which a senior editor blamed censorship accusations on “butthurt ex-Post employees with axes to grind”.

Chinese money is also being invested in print media far from home, including in South Africa, where companies linked to the Chinese state have a 20% stake in Independent Media, the country’s second-largest media group, which runs 20 prominent newspapers. In cases like this, Beijing’s impact on day-to-day operations can be minimal, but there are still things that cannot be said, as one South African journalist, Azad Essa, recently discovered when he used his column, which ran in a number of newspapers published by Independent Media, to criticise Beijing’s mass internment of Uighurs. Hours later, his column had been cancelled. The company blamed a redesign of the paper, which had necessitated changes in the columnists used.

But Essa pulled no punches in a piece he subsequently wrote for Foreign Policy: “Red lines are thick and non-negotiable. Given the economic dependence on the Chinese and crisis in newsrooms, this is rarely confronted. And this is precisely the type of media environment that China wants their African allies to replicate.” This is true not just in Africa, but for China’s media interests across the world.

These days Australia has come to be seen as a petri dish for Chinese influence overseas. At the heart of the row is a controversial Chinese billionaire, Huang Xiangmo, whose links to Labor party politician Sam Dastyari precipitated Dastyari’s resignation in 2017. Three years earlier, Huang provided A$1.8m of seed funding to establish the Australia China Relations Institute, a thinktank based at the University of Technology Sydney. ACRI, which is led by former foreign minister Bob Carr, aims to promote “a positive and optimistic view of Australia-China relations”.

In the past two years, ACRI has spearheaded a programme organising study tours to China for at least 28 high-profile Australian journalists, whisking them on all-expenses tours with extraordinary access. Many of the breathless resulting articles – footnoting their status as “guests of ACRI” or “guests of the All China Journalist Association” – accord remarkably closely with Beijing’s strategic priorities. As well as paeans to China’s modernity and size, the articles advise Australians not to turn their backs on China’s One Belt One Road initiative, and not to publicly criticise China’s policy towards the South China Sea, or anything else for that matter.

Close observers believe the scheme is tilting China coverage in Australia. Economist Stephen Joske briefed the first ACRI tour on the country’s economic challenges, and was dismayed at the largely uncritical tone of their coverage. “Australian elites have very little real exposure to China,” he said. “There is a vacuum of informed commentary and they [ACRI-sponsored journalists] have filled it with very, very one-sided information.”

Participants on the study tours do not downplay their influence. “I found the trip fantastic”, says one reporter who asked not to be named. “In Australia, the reporting often doesn’t go beyond having a one-party communist system. There’s a lot of positive things happening in China in terms of technology, business and trade, and that doesn’t get a lot of positive coverage.” Others treat the trips with more caution. “You go on these trips knowing you’re going to be getting their point of view,” says the ABC’s economics correspondent Peter Ryan, who went on an ACRI-sponsored trip in 2016.

ACRI responded to our questions about the trips by issuing a statement, saying that its tours “pale into insignificance” compared with similar trips organised by the US and Israel. A spokesman wrote: “Not for a moment has ACRI ever lobbied journalists about what they write. They are free to take whatever position they want.” The spokesman also confirmed that in-kind support to the trips has been given by the All-China Journalists Association, a Communist party body whose mission is to “tell China’s stories well, spread China’s voice”. For his part, Huang Xiangmo said he has no involvement in ACRI’s operations.

ACRI is a relatively new player in this game. Since 2009, the China-United States Exchange Foundation (Cusef), headed by Hong Kong’s millionaire former chief executive Tung Chee-hwa, has taken 127 US journalists from 40 US outlets to China, as well as congressmen and senators. Since Tung has an official position – vice-chairman of the Chinese government advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – Cusef is registered as a “foreign principal” under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (Fara).

A picture of how Cusef has worked to sway coverage of China inside the US can be found in Fara filings by a PR firm working for the foundation since 2009. BLJ Worldwide, which has also represented Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, the Gaddafi family, and Qatar’s World Cup bid, organised journalist tours and cultivated a number of what it calls “third-party supporters” to marshal positive coverage of China in the US. In one year alone, 2010, BLJ’s target was to place an average of three articles per week in the US media, in venues such as the Wall Street Journal, for which it was paid around $20,000 a month. In a memo from November 2017, BLJ lists eight recommended third-party supporters who, it claimed, “can engage by writing their own op-eds, providing endorsements of Cusef, and potentially speaking to select media”. Fara filings also show that in 2010, BLJ discussed how to influence the way US schoolchildren are taught about China’s much-criticised role in Tibet. After conducting a review of four high-school textbooks, BLJ proposed “a strong, factual counter-narrative be introduced to defend and promote the actions of China within the Tibet Autonomous Region”.

Over the past decade, Cusef has widened its remit, mooting ambitious cultural diplomacy plans to influence the US public. According to a January 2018 memo, one of the schemes included a plan to build a Chinese “town called Gung-Ho in Detroit”. The memo suggests redeveloping an entire city block to showcase Chinese innovation using design elements from both countries, with a budget of $8-10m. The memo even suggests shooting a reality TV show following the progress of the Gung-Ho community as “a living metaphor for the promise of the US-China relationship”. Given Detroit’s parlous state, the memo concludes, “It will be very difficult for the news media to be critical of the project.”

Cusef responded to questions about its activities with a statement, saying: “Cusef has supported projects which enhance the communication and understanding between peoples of US and China. All of our programmes and activities operate within the framework of the laws and we are fully committed to carrying out our work by maintaining the highest standard of integrity.” BLJ did not respond to requests for comment.

China’s active courtship of journalists extends well beyond short-term study tours to encompass longer-term programmes for reporters from developing countries. These moves were formalised under the auspices of the China Public Diplomacy Association, established in 2012. The targets are extraordinarily ambitious: the training of 500 Latin American and Caribbean journalists over five years, and 1,000 African journalists a year by 2020.

Through these schemes, foreign reporters are schooled not just on China, but also on its view of journalism. To China’s leaders, journalistic ideals such as critical reporting and objectivity are not just hostile, they pose an existential threat. One leaked government directive, known as Document 9, even defines the ultimate goal of the western media as to “gouge an opening through which to infiltrate our ideology”. This gulf in journalistic values was further underlined in a series of CGTN videos issued last year, featuring prominent Chinese journalists accusing non-Chinese practitioners of being “brainwashed” by “western values of journalism”, which are depicted as irresponsible and disruptive to society. One Xinhua editor, Luo Jun, argues in favour of censorship, saying, “We have to take responsibility for what we report. If that’s being considered as censorship, I think it’s good censorship.”

With its fellowships for foreign reporters, Beijing is moving to train a young generation of international journalists. A current participant in this programme is Filipino journalist Greggy Eugenio, who is finishing up an all-expenses-paid media fellowship for reporters from countries participating in China’s grand global infrastructure push, the Belt and Road Initiative. For 10 months, Eugenio has been studying and travelling around China on organised tours, as well as doing a six-week internship at state-run television. Twice a week he attends classes on language, culture, politics and new media at Beijing’s Renmin University of China, as he works towards a master’s degree in communication.

“This programme continuously opens my mind and heart on a lot of misconceptions I’ve known about China,” Eugenio said in an email. “I’ve learned that a state-owned government media is one of the most effective means of journalism. The media in China is still working well and people here appreciate their work.” Throughout his time in China, he has been filing stories for the state-run Philippine News Agency, and when he finishes next month he will return to his position writing for the presidential communication team of Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte.

Some observers argue the expansion of authoritarian propaganda networks – such as Russia’s RT and Iran’s Press TV – has been overhyped, with little real impact on global journalism. But Beijing’s play is bigger and more multifaceted. At home, it is building the world’s biggest broadcaster by combining its three mammoth radio and television networks into a single body, the Voice of China. At the same time, a reshuffle has transferred responsibility for the propaganda machinery from state bodies to the Communist party, which effectively tightens party control over the message. Overseas, capitalising on the move from analogue to digital broadcasting, it has used proxies likesuch as StarTimes to increase its control over global telecommunications networks, while building out new digital highways. “The real brilliance of it is not just trying to control all content – it’s the element of trying to control the key nodes in the information flow,” says Freedom House’s Sarah Cook. “It might not be necessarily clear as a threat now, but once you’ve got control over the nodes of information you can use them as you want.”

Such blatant exhibitions of power indicate the new mood of assertiveness. In information warfare – as in so much else – Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim of “hide your strength and bide your time” is over. As the world’s second-largest economy, China has decided it needs discourse power commensurate with its new global stature. Last week, a group of the US’s most distinguished China experts released a startling report expressing concern over China’s more aggressive projections of power. Many of the experts have spent decades promoting engagement with China, yet they conclude: “The ambition of Chinese activity in terms of the breadth, depth of investment of financial resources, and intensity requires far greater scrutiny than it has been getting.”

As Beijing and its proxies extend their reach, they are harnessing market forces to silence the competition. Discourse power is, it seems, a zero-sum game for China, and voices that are critical of Beijing are co-opted or silenced, left without a platform or drowned out in the sea of positive messaging created by Beijing’s own “borrowed” and “bought” boats. As the west’s media giants flounder, China’s own media imperialism is on the rise, and the ultimate battle may not be for the means of news production, but for journalism itself.


https://medium.com/watchout
偽裝、抹粉、大撒幣 — — 中國用錢讓全球媒體「講好中國故事」
(沃草公民學院編譯及撰稿/賴昀、洪國鈞)

這幾年中國不斷透過金錢攻勢收買全球媒體,或是直接在國外成立官媒分公司,偽裝成「外國媒體」,撰寫讚揚中國政府的報導,替中國內外部矛盾猜脂抹粉,而這樣花錢「大撒幣」干預媒體的行為,已經引起國際媒體警覺。《沃草》以英國《衛報》12月初(7)的專題報導為主,並綜合《紐約時報》和《華盛頓郵報》新聞,告訴讀者中國如何滲透全球媒體和民間智庫。
利用全球媒體「講好中國故事」

根據英國《衛報》專題報導,中國為了實踐在全球宣傳「銳實力」的野心,北京正在收購媒體和對大批外國記者進行培訓,為的是實現「講好中國故事」計畫。而「講好中國故事」也是在2016年2月19日,習近平視察央視、人民日報社和新華社時提出的談話內容,並成為中國積極在海外擴張話語權計畫的一部分。

中國環球電視網(CGTN)開出相較於西方媒體更為優渥的誘人待遇,吸引大量外國記者前往應徵,讓他們為「講好中國故事」服務。CGTN是中國中央電視台(央視,CCTV)旗下的國際部門,在2016年時開播。CGTN的成立被視為中國在全球迅速擴張媒體影響力的里程碑,成立目的就是為了習近平所說的「講好中國故事」,為中國的國家意識形態服務,替中國官方宣傳。

在過去十幾年,中國不斷試圖在國際媒體上擴大影響力。他們利用龐大資金,用下廣告或是贊助的方式,左右外媒的報導走向和對中國的態度,有計畫性地傷害新聞自由來獲取利益。

在美國,受到中國金援的遊說團體,成為中國的傳聲筒,並努力動搖歐美國家對「中國佔據西藏」的看法。與此同時,中國大舉招待世界各地記者參加全額贊助的旅遊活動,甚至以給予大量獎學金和免費授與傳播相關學位的方式,每年訓練大批年輕的外國記者來「講好中國故事」。中國為此也訂下了計畫目標:到2020年,每年培訓500名中南美洲和1000名非洲記者。
用金錢攻勢「讓外國服務中國」

從毛澤東時代起,「讓外國服務中國」就是中國共產黨的策略。在1930年代,美國記者 Edgar Snow 獲得授權寫的《紅星照耀中國》(Red Star Over China,中文版在當年為了順利發行更名為《西行漫記》),就成功讓共產黨人得到西方世界的同情。八十年過去了,「讓外國服務中國」更進一步,開始利用聘雇外籍員工的媒體,為黨的利益服務。

2012年,在中國共產黨第十八次全國代表大會的記者會上,政府官員一再點名一位年輕澳洲白人女記者 — — Andrea Yu 發問,她則以流利的中文,提出像是中國官媒央視或新華社記者的問題。
在中共十八大記者會的外媒提問環節用中文發問的澳洲記者Andrea Yu被發現為中國人成立的媒體公司工作。

其實,Andrea Yu 在一家名為 Global CAMG Media Group (CAMG) 的媒體工作,該公司總部位於澳洲,公司老闆是中國人 Tommy Jiang。該公司由北京一家名為國光世紀媒體諮詢公司的集團擁有60%的股權,後者又隸屬在官媒中國國際廣播電台 (CRI) 旗下。CAMG 和 Tommy Jiang 的另一家公司 Ostar,在澳洲至少擁有11家廣播電台,他們會將 CRI 製作的內容置入自家節目中,並出售給其他針對澳洲龐大華語居民的社區廣播電台。像 CAMG 這樣在中國境外播送 CRI 製作內容的公司現在遍佈35個國家,總共營運著58個電台。美國副總統 Mike Pence 也在最近的演講中指出,光是美國就有超過30個機構在播放這些內容。

在 Andrea Yu 被指責是為中國政府工作的「假外媒」不久之後,她就離開了 CAMG,但兩年後在中國全國人民大會上,一樣的事再次發生。中國將僅有的外媒提問機會,給了一位講中文的澳洲記者 Louise Kenney,他同樣為 CAMG 工作。

類似的故事也發生在今年3月的中國全國人民代表大會記者會上,在外媒提問時獲得點名發問的美國全美電視台(AMTV)執行台長張慧君因提問時敘述冗長、語意不清,被旁邊的第一財經電視記者梁相宜翻了個白眼。這一幕被央視直播,瞬間在網路上爆紅。根據公民記者事後的追查,發現「美國全美電視台」沒有電視台信號、沒有實際辦公地址,官網內容乏善可陳,大多是粗製濫造的業配新聞,在臉書上的讚數也只有30個,註冊時間是2017年,於是就被質疑是為該年度的中國共產黨第十九次全國代表大會和之後的第十三屆中國全國人民代表大會而設的「假外媒」。
遭質疑是「假外媒」的AMTV台長張慧君在提問時,被旁邊的中國記者梁相宜翻白眼。

中國國際廣播電台(CRI)主席將此類利用外國傳媒名義播報中國官方產製獲批准內容的策略,稱為「借船出海」。中國政府運用相似的方式影響實體刊物。中國國營英文報紙《中國日報》與包括《紐約時報》、《華爾街日報》、《華盛頓郵報》和《每日電訊報》在內的至少30家外國報紙達成協議,以每月四到八頁的「中國觀察」版面來為中國進行樣版宣傳;最近出現的新聞包括「西藏在40年來取得輝煌成就」、「習近平透露對外開放措施」,以及最不意外的「習近平讚揚中國共產黨員」。

2017年以來,《中國日報》已經在美國花費了2080萬美元來增加其影響力。在英國,中國官方以每年支付75萬英鎊(約台幣2900萬元)讓《每日電訊報》在每個月刊出「中國觀察」,《每日郵報》也與中共喉舌《人民日報》合作,刊登來自中國的聳動新聞來換取高點擊率。「借船出海」戰略同時也利用讓中國報導出現在國際知名媒體上,為這些報導內容提升了可信度。
美國民間智庫「收錢辦事」 撰寫報告讚揚華為

中國的金錢攻勢還入侵了美國著名民間智庫《布魯金斯研究院》(Brookings Institute)。《華盛頓郵報》在7日的評論文章中指出,儘管華為已被美國政府視為有國安威脅的公司,Brookings Institute 仍收了華為公司的贊助,撰寫讚揚華為科技的報告。
《華盛頓郵報》報導指出,美國民間智庫拿華為的贊助,撰寫讚揚華為的報告。

其實華為早就被美國政府視為國家安全威脅,2012年美國國會就已指控華為試圖竊取美國企業的機敏資料;近日,甚至逮捕了人在加拿大的華為財務長孟晚舟。但是,從2016年7月至2018年6月間,華為仍透過在美國的子公司,給了 Brookings 至少 30萬美元(約927萬台幣),贊助「政府治理研究」計畫。

負責撰寫這份讚揚華為報告的 Darrell M. West,也是 Brookings 的副總裁,卻在美國政府對華為提出國家安全疑慮時,在華為舉辦的會議中稱「美國政府對華為並不公平」。《紐約時報》也在上個月底(25)的報導中,揭露習近平的姪子(或外甥)過去在唸書時,在 Brookings 實習。
中國解放軍的媒體戰爭

在2003年時,人民解放軍已在官方文件將「媒體戰」明確定調為軍事戰略的一部分,目的是影響海外輿論,以促使外國政府制定有利於中共政府的政策。前美國中情局分析師、現任詹姆斯敦基金會中國計畫研究員Peter Mattis直指中國政府的目的,就是要「排除可能不利中華人民共和國的政策決議」。

除了一貫的審查制度:恐嚇異議者、打擊可能的異議平台,或者大肆收購媒體平台,中國政府還透過民營公司增加對全球數位基礎建設的控制,包括非洲地區的電視衛星和光纖電纜,利用「數位絲路」掌控來自全世界的資訊。經由這種方式,中國不僅控制新聞產製和內容,也逐漸掌握傳播工具。

現在,中國正無所不用其極地增強其「國際話語權」,利用自由市場的力量來影響媒體,批評的聲音不是被收買就是噤聲,新聞市場被正面的中國新聞淹沒。屬於中國的「媒體帝國主義」正在興起,媒體不只是這場「全球資訊戰」的戰場,更是打擊「西方新聞價值觀」的武器;而他們的最終戰場,可能不只是掌控「新聞的製作方式」,而是整個「新聞產業」。

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1982年、臺灣訪問。ソルジェニーツィン「臺灣の若者はチャイナと戰へ!アメリカはチャイナ共産黨のウソに騙されてゐる!」

天國で「ピルズベリーごときが今頃騷いでも遲い」と嘆いてゐるだらう。


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索忍尼辛在自由中國,索忍尼辛在中山堂演講  
吳三連文藝基金會主辦索忍尼辛演講會,4點報告。1、今天演講長度前後共50分鐘,2、索忍尼辛不回答問題,3、請了教授王兆彬做翻譯,4、感謝新聞局提供的協助。
(索忍尼辛在自由中國,索忍尼辛在中山堂演講/索忍尼辛演講)

和人民生活各方面都有顯著的成就,並且顯示出如果大陸不淪入敵人之手,國家的力量一定會朝向同樣明確的方向發展,我總覺得是人會認清這種含有教訓意義的比較。會清楚的看到,凡是逃離共黨的人民是多麼繁榮,而陷入共黨統下的人民卻有千百萬人慘死,共產黨在蘇俄,在波蘭,在寮國的殘暴史實,早已為大家所熟知,至於在中央,在越南在北韓,千百萬生靈被摧毀的史賓相信早晚也會很詳盡地被揭開,即使在今天,我們仍然能從一些蛛絲馬跡中推斷出來,其實並不如此,事實上自由中竟受到其他國家,非常不公平和不平等的待遇,世界上大多數的國家都不顧道義,把你們逼出聯合國,自從他們把1700萬自由中國人,排除聯合國之門後,這些代表雖然仍在那裡繼續叫囂,唏噓,吶喊著可是聯合國卻以便成了一個,不負責任滑稽劇場而自取其辱了,在這裡,第三世界,許多國家也向喪失理性的瘋子一般。扮演著跳樑小丑,他們不知道自由的真諦,而坐待壓迫桎悎得到來,至於西方世界若干世紀以來,早已熟知自由的真諦,可是由於長久以來,生活在幸福安樂之中,他們為自由所付出的,有愈來愈少的傾向,西方人一項珍視自己的國家的體制「自由民主」,但是為保衛這一體制,挺身而出的人愈來愈少了,西方保衛自己能力正一個年代不如一個年代地衰退,喪失中,一個國家接著一個國家的背叛行為,只是為了自身的苟安,這種現象在二次大戰前就已經開始了,到戰後,更不惜出賣了整個東歐,只是為了能夠使自己的幸福生活持續的更久一些,波蘭米可拉伊奇科政權多麼輕易地被出賣了,同樣地,自己的戰時盟友蔣介石也被輕易地出賣了,不久的將來我們也會看到一個西方國家。只是為了茍全自己而出賣另一個國家,大多數恐懼共黨的西方國家為了怕激怒中共,甚至於不敢出售武器給貴國;你們對這點會感到驚奇嗎?事實上,他們對自由的維護和關懷根本是微不足道的,目前飽受威脅的歐洲最可能了解這種情況,可是怎麼都害怕承認中華民國和鄭遭受威脅的亞州國家呢?不久前日本首相曾經說過,如果武裝自由中國,會給遠東帶來不安,可是真如此的話,那還有什麼可說的呢?他們不斷地尋求苟安之道,選擇自己的替身而置身事外,並且創初一個迷人的神話說:有「壞」的共產主義,也有「好」的共產主義,利用這個神話,把中共塑造成一個本質善良的和平締造者。當南韓目前免於遭受共黨攻擊之際,又產生了一種神話,也不足為奇;誤認為蘇俄並不仇恨他們,蘇俄不像北韓那樣是南韓的直接敵人,現在他們為了盡量討好北京。而正在搖擺佈定,是不是該把中共投誠的飛機交給自由中國呢?這種神話的來源,並不足由於他們,沒有遠見或是愚蠢,而是由於絕望和精神喪失的緣故,美國對貴國的關係是很特殊的,到今天為止,美國的唯一保證就是使台灣不受共黨攻擊,可是今天美國要保持對台灣的忠實承諾有多困難呢?要知道它對貴國的承諾已經喪失泰半,美國也以屈服於世界上普遍的逆流,要背棄台灣陷自由中國的命運於為難的境地。而不惜背叛許多自由國家。正因如此,他們欣然響應中共和平統一的虛偽建議,許多美國記者大聲疾呼,目前「北京」一定會遵守。實踐和平統一的諾言,可是他們完全忘記了,共產黨人已經不只一次地欺騙了世人,戰後東歐若干政府和共黨聯合的經驗並沒有給世人留下任何教訓,而現在這種。沒有希望的聯合政府的試驗,又在寮國重演,同樣地,在季辛吉和北越簽訂合約之後。世人一直到北越決定侵占越南那天為止,都還相信北越會遵守諾言的住的美國傳播媒體,設置愚蠢到這種程度,意然說美國並沒有犯任何錯誤,如果說中共違反諾言,以武力侵占台灣,那時美國又將可不受義務的約束,而再度開始運送武器,到那時武器交給誰呢?這種囈語竟然出現在美國很都多主要的報章上,他們這樣做究竟為了什麼?恐怕連他們自己都不明白吧!美國有權威的人士竟想迫使台灣去做投降式的談判,讓台灣自願地獻出自己的自由和力量。中共到底想向你們要些什麼呢?當然他們渴望侵佔你們繁榮的經濟,掠奪和吞時你們的一切再經歷了20世紀許多大事件之後,只有一些短視無知的人,才會相信「北京」的諾言,認為他們會完全保留你們的經濟社會制度,甚至你們的武裝力量,同時讓你們也保留某些自由的要素,對他們來說主要的並不在於要剝奪你們的財物,剽竊你們辛苦得來的果實而是在於不管在什麼地方,也不管是什麼事情,共黨制度也都不能容忍有一點點的偏差,與其說,它所需要的事富足的寶島,毋寧說它需要抑制,脫離它制度的偏差,因為讓其他的中國「指大陸同胞」知道由沒有共產主義。中共所不能容忍的是你們經濟和社會的優勢,可能生活得更好,那是不可以的,在共黨的意識形勢裡,是不容許有任何自由島嶼存在的,所以就連,他們也千方百計地制止銷售給他們,以便削弱你們的戰鬥力量,破壞海峽的均勢,使他們入侵台灣的日期提早來臨,為了促使美國漠視台灣,中共已開始利用它和蘇俄的和解,「玩蘇俄牌」而這種和解並不是完全故作姿勢,而是有其遠景的,因為兩個共黨政權畢竟是出自同一根源的,有一件事現在大家早已忘記了哪就是,1923年,蘇俄的代表魯金別格--化名「鮑羅亭」。曾經準備在中國發動共產主義的政變,因此,他才把毛澤東,周恩來提升到黨內最高地位,我在此之所以把這些奉告各位乃是由於你們你們所面臨的事致命的威脅,幸好這一點在台灣的人工,即使並全部。但大多數人都很了解,你們對這種威脅的了解顯然的比南韓要好得多,在南韓,年輕的一代和大學生,完全忘了共黨侵略所帶來短暫的恐懼,而覺得他們所享有的自由似乎太少,可是,一但當他們兩守被縛被押送共黨集中營的時候,他們就會懷念和重估今天他們所謂「不自由」的價值,在西方似乎流行著一種潮流,那就是向站在反共前線的國家,伺在敵人炮火威脅下的國家,要求廣泛的民主,不只是普通的民主,而是絕對的放任,以及背叛國和任意破壞國家的權利,西方國家不僅允許這些行為在他們自己的國家發生,而且更要求每一個受敵人威脅的國家,包括貴國在內也要付出同樣的代價;所幸。在台灣我覺得大家對這種行為都能有理性的節制。這都是為了在反共鬥爭中能夠堅持下去的緣故,可是,另一個危險正在虎視眈眈地環伺著,貴國的經濟成就和民生富裕具有雙重特性,一方它是全中國人明光明希望的所寄,另一方面它也可能顯露出你們的弱點,因為所有生活富裕的人們容易喪失對危機的警覺,沉緬於今日的生活,結果可能喪失了抗敵意志。我希望並且呼籲你們,能夠揚棄這一弱點。在你們物質生活有所成就的時候,不要讓你們的青年懦弱到寧願做敵人的俘虜和奴隸,也不願意去戰鬥你們在台灣33年的和平生活,並不意味今後3年你們不會遭受攻擊,你們不是生活在一各無憂無慮的寶島上,你們應該全國皆兵,因為你們不斷受著戰爭的威脅,你們1800萬的人口,所面臨問題的深度,正如同猶太人一樣,但是猶太人的問題,曾引起許多國家的注意,而成為當今世界的中心問題,你們的特殊情況,跟猶太人比較一下,我不理解為什麼台灣命運不能博得世界的注意呢?當前世界出賣弱者的現象甚囂塵上,說實在的,你們只有依賴你們自己本身的力量,可是你們也有一個更大更光明的希望,那就市被奴役國家的人民,不會無限度的忍耐下去,當他們的統治者們面臨嚴重危機的時候,他們就會揭竿而起來推翻暴政。在我閱讀過你們許多書籍當中,瞭解到你們的寶島,乃是民族復興的基地,但願它是!自救和防衛部應該是你們最後的目標,你們最後的目標應該是幫助和姐就你們在大陸受難的同班,首先,最要的是盡量而勇敢的運用你們的廣播和電視的傳播功能。似乎在別人的心目中無法指出誰是你們堅強可靠的盟友,但是你們面臨危亡之際,你們會有全世界最堅強的盟邦,那就示億萬的中國人,他們的同情與支持。就是你們的精神和士氣的最大支柱,就在幾天前,你們就收到了一個具有鼓舞性的信號。那就是唾棄共產暴政的中共飛行員架使飛機抵南韓,投奔自由,這正是表現了中國大陸人民嚮往自由的真正情感,我常常很痛心地想,中國「古拉格群島」裡許多無名的囚犯,他們的苦難也許要到21世紀才能向世人宣洩,所有被壓迫的人民,包括蘇俄人民在內,都不能依賴外界的援助,為有依靠自己的力量。如果發狂的中共和蘇俄的統治者之間發動了戰爭,整各世界都會作壁上觀的,說不定他們內心還會感到莫大的安慰,我但願這件事情不會發生,但是不管怎樣,讓我門在此位中國人和俄國人間的友好和信任作見證,甚至於在任何情況下,我們之間都不要有矛盾存在;進一步來說,我門受迫害的兩國人民應該聯合起來共同對抗2個共產政權,不管2個貪婪的。反人民的專制政權發生什麼事情,讓我門兩國人民保持互相了解,互相同情和友誼,決不讓無益的民族仇很蒙蔽了耳目,我門不知道共產主義會為禍世界多久,記得有人曾經在135年前,誇耀著向當時若干大帝國的領袖們說過,再歐洲所組成的一小撮烏托邦共產黨徒們,會用鐵和血征服這些領袖,並使他們屈膝而喪失他們的權威和驕傲,可是這些領袖對他這種狂言都認為不值一孝,因為像這樣的預言,他們認為沒有力量。共產黨的力量原本是壓榨和殘酷,而西方世界的弱點在於缺乏戰鬥的意志,我門不知道人類歷史還要走多少稀奇古怪的曲折道路,我曾經表達了我自己的推測,全世界的共產主義思想,或許比蘇俄和中共的共產主義制度存在得更久,還可能會蔓延到其他國家,因為在哪裡願意嘗試共產主義的人很多,不過在我門兩國國民的意識裡,理性的體認很佔優勢,儘管兩國人民飽經苦難喪失甚多,畢竟正在邁向自就和復興的道路。
http://city.udn.com/66275/5108155


To Free China 'Showing the world the difference'
Publication Date: December 01, 1984

"But the main issue is not to steal away your wealth, to steal the fruits of your hard work. The main thing is that the Communist system does not tolerate any deviation in anything or anywhere." (File Photo)
... a statement on the condition of a divided world -
                 by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

For 33 years, Taiwan, I believe, has attracted, by its specific fate, the attention of many people throughout the world. I myself felt that way long ago. About thirty countries have already fallen under the yoke of Communism. Scarcely one of them has been fortunate enough to retain even a tiny patch of its independent national territory, where its state authority could continue to develop despite the disruption, and through comparison show the world the difference between itself and Communist disorganization. In Russia, such a patch of land could have been Wrangel's Crimea. But lacking any external support and abandoned by its unfaithful former allies, it was soon crushed by the Communists. But in China, thanks to a wide Strait, a fragment of the former state became the Republic of China on Taiwan, which, for a third of a century, has proved to the world what heights of development could have been reached if the whole of China had not fallen under the yoke of Communism. Today, the Republic of China on Taiwan differs from the other in its development, its industrial achievements and the well-being of its population, thereby proving how logically the forces of a nation can be guided, if they are not in inimical hands.

It would seem that the population of our planet should clearly perceive such an instructive comparison and should have its eyes opened to see how peoples who escape Communism flourish and how those who fall victim to Communist tenets perish by the millions. The history of Communist destructions in the Soviet Union, Poland and Cambodia are now known to all. The history of the millions destroyed in China, Vietnam or North Korea is yet to be revealed in detail, but many signs allow us to judge this history even now.

But NO! It is Free China which has had to endure and suffer from the greatest injustices and ignoble attitudes of other countries. The United Nations, long degraded to an irresponsible side show, disgraced itself by expelling from membership the 17 millions of Free China. The majority of countries on our planet treacherously expelled your country from the U.N., whose delegates, adding insult to injury, whistled, jeered and shouted. The majority of Third World countries behaved like madmen who don't know the price of freedom but are themselves waiting for the kick of the boot.

For centuries the Western World has known very well the price of freedom. But with years passing and well being achieved, it is less and less pre pared to pay for it. The Western people value their state systems but are less and less inclined to defend them with their own bodies. From decade to decade, the West has become increasingly senile and unable to defend itself. The betrayal of one country after another had already begun before the Second World War. Afterward, no scruples were felt in abrogating the whole of Eastern Europe just for the sake of the West's own well-being. How easy it was to betray the government of Mikolaychik; how easy it was to withdraw support from one's ally, Chiang Kai-shek. And soon we shall witness how one country will betray another for the price of surviving just a little longer. Should it be surprising that the majority of the frightened Western countries are even afraid to sell you weapons for fear of angering Peking. That's how much their drive and concern for freedom is worth. Meanwhile, threatened Europe should understand your position better but is so cowardly that it fails to recognize that the Republic of China and other countries of Asia are themselves endangered. Just recently, the former premier of Japan declared that the arming of Free China would destabilize the Far East! What more can be said?

They are all obsessed with the search for self-protection and the quest for a stand-in. So there emerged an attractive myth-that there are "bad" and "good" Communisms. And out of such a myth grew the image of Communist China as a good-natured peacemaker! But should that be surprising-when in South Korea, which herself survived a Communist assault, there exists a myth that actually the Soviet Union is not directly hostile to them, not so much an enemy, not like North Korea. The South Koreans have also been doing their utmost to curry favor with Peking. Now they are hesitating about whether to give a defecting Red Chinese aircraft to Free China.

No, it is not out of shortsightedness, not out of stupidity, that such myths are believed, but out of despair, out of the loss of spirit.

In a particular relationship to you is the United States of America. Up to this day, the United States provides the only outside guaranty restraining the Communists from attacking your island. But how difficult it becomes for the United States to remain faithful to Taiwan; how much has already been lost on the way! The Americans have also succumbed to the general world trend to leave the Republic of China to its perils, to abandon it to its fate. America moved to abrogate its diplomatic relations with the R.O.C. For what? For what fault of hers? Only to follow the futile Western dream of gaining an ally in Communist China. America has restricted its connections with you, curtailed its military support and is denying you much of what you need.

What pressures have been exerted upon American presidents, urging surrender of Taiwan! Not all of them could bear the strain. Here we have a former president, just back from a visit to China, where he flattered his hosts by saying that "a strong Communist China is a guarantee for peace" and that America seems to be interested in a strong Red China. Such people in former years have governed the United States and there is no guarantee that another such person might not succeed President Reagan.

The United States is highly heterogeneous. There are many currents, of which the capitulatory tides are quite powerful. Extremely powerful circles are leaning toward betrayal of a free country in favor of a friendship with a totalitarian one. They gladly picked up the hypocritical offer from Communist China on "peaceful unification." Many American journalists cry from the housetops that Peking is now "bound by promises" to effect unification peacefully. They wanted to forget, and therefore successfully forgot, how many times the Communists have already cheated. The experience of "governments in concert with Communists" in postwar Eastern Europe has taught no lesson. This hope less experiment now is being conducted in Cambodia. Similarly, according to Kissinger's agreement, North Vietnam was "bound by a ceasefire"-until it set the day for the seizure of South Vietnam. And leading American newsmen reached such heights of stupidity as to write that the United States doesn't make mistakes. If Red China "breaks its promise" and seizes Taiwan by force then-only then-America would be freed from obligations and could again start to deliver arms ... to whom, then? ... Yes, such delirium appears on the pages of leading American newspapers, and they don't realize what they are doing!

And thus the influential circles in the United States want to force Taiwan to accept capitulatory negotiations, to relinquish voluntarily its freedom and power.

What, then, does Communist China want from you? Certainly, it is eager to grab your blossoming economy, to plunder and devour it. After all that has happened in the 20th century, only shortsighted simpletons can trust Peking's promises that it will totally preserve your economic and social system, and even your armed forces along with some elements of freedom. But the main issue is not to take away your wealth, to steal the fruits of your hard work. The main thing is that the Communist system does not tolerate any deviation in anything or anywhere. Not even the wealth of your island is important. What matters is the deviation from their system. Communist China hates you for your economic and social superiority. For them it is not permissible that other Chinese should know that there can be a better life without Communism. The Communist ideology does not tolerate any islets of freedom. And so, with all their might, the Communists want to cut off the sale to you even of defensive arms, to try to weaken your defense capability, to disturb your balance of power in the Straits-and thus to bring closer the day of intrusion into your island.

In order to nurture the apathy of the United States, Red China plays speculatively on the negotiations between Peking and Moscow on matters of China Soviet rapprochement. Such rapprochement is not make-believe. It is a very realistic perspective. Both governments have long had common roots, a fact which everybody seems to forget. As far back as 1923, a Soviet agent Grusemberg, alias "Borodin," prepared a Communist coup, and it was he who promoted Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-Iai to the highest positions in the party.

All that I am telling you - because of the deadly danger in which you find your self-is understood well by many, if not yet by all. The threat is understood better here than in South Korea, where the young generation, the college students, have quite forgotten the brief horrors of Communist intrusion, so that the present freedom seems to them not enough. But they will remember and revalue their present "non-freedom" when, after a command "hands back," they are driven under armed guards into concentration camps.

It seems to be fashionable in the West to demand from all who stand in the forefront of defense, under machine gun fire, to demand the widest democracy, and not just simple, but absolute democracy, bordering on total dissolute ness, on state treason, on the right to destroy their own state and country-such freedom as Western countries tolerate. Such is the price the West demands from each menaced country, including yours. But it seems that on your island the logical limits are known and will sustain your struggle.

There is another danger stalking you. Your economic successes, your living standards and well-being are o(a two-fold nature. These are the bright hope of all the Chinese people. But they also can become your weakness.

All prosperous people tend to lose the aware ness of danger, an addiction of the good living conditions of today, and consequently lose their will for resistance. I hope and I urge you to avoid such a weakening. Don't. permit the youth of your country to become soft and placid, to become slaves to material goods, until finally they will prefer captivity and slavery to the struggle for freedom. That for 33 years you lived peacefully does not mean that 'you might 'not be attacked in the following three years. You are not a serene, care-free island; you are an army, constantly under the menace of war.

document p6

Nobel laureate Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn receives a copy of the historical work Soviet Russia in China by Chiang Kai-shek from Government Information Office Director General Dr. James C.Y. Soong, as Adm.,Ma Chi-chuang, Secretary-General to the President, looks on. (File photo)

You are 18 millions, about as many as there are Jews in the world, and your problem is of the same dimensions. But the Jewish problem attracts the attention of all states and has become one of the central problems of contemporary times. Comparing this with the uniqueness of your position, I don't perceive why the fate of Taiwan should not command the equal attention of the world.

But in today's world betrayal from weakness reigns supreme, and it is only your own strength upon which you can really rely. But there is also one bigger and brighter hope: the peoples of the enslaved nations, who will not endure indefinitely but who will rise in one menacing hour-menacing to their Communist rulers.

In your books you write that your island is a "bastion of national recovery." So be it! Not only defense, not only self preservation should be your goal-'but help, but the liberation of your compatriots suffering on the mainland, and first of all, through free and courageous radio broadcasts.

It may seem, since no one comes to mind, that you have no firm, reliable allies, although they might appear in the hour of destruction. But you have the most formidable ally in the world: one billion Chinese people. Their sympathy is your moral and spiritual support. Just a few days ago, you had an encouraging signal from your compatriots through the act of defection of a Red Chinese air force pilot. Often I think of still anonymous prisoners of the Chinese Gulags whose true story might not be told until the 21st century.

All the oppressed people, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, cannot rely on outside help, only on their own strength. At the best, the whole world would watch indifferently, but possibly with a great deal of relief, if the mad rulers of China and the USSR should unleash war among them. I hope that won't happen. But in any case, let us testify here and now to the mutual amicability and trust between the Chinese and Russian peoples, to the absence of contradictions amongst them; even more, let us hope for a union of our long suffering compatriots against both Communist governments. Whatever might happen between these two self-interested, anti national governments, let us preserve mutual understanding, mutual compassion and friendship; let's not allow them to blind our eyes and deaden our ears through fruitless national hatred.

We don't know how long the plague of Communism will affect our world. One hundred and thirty-five years ago, who would have told the leaders of the then great empires that the tiny group of utopians-Communists who organized themselves in Europe - would conquer them all with iron and blood, and force to their knees their might and pride? They would not even have smiled at such a prophecy. Such forces could not then be seen anywhere. The strength of the Communists was based on their drive and their cruelty; the weakness of the West was rooted in the absence of the will to fight.

We don't know what whimsical zigzags human history will follow. I have al ready expressed a supposition that world Communism will outlive both Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes and spread over other countries, many of which are still eager to experience Communism. But in our two countries nation al commonsense shall finally prevail! Anyway, both our peoples have suffered too much, lost too much! They are already moving along the way of liberation and recovery!

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大學院授業。
初唐の『藝文類聚』卷八十四「寶玉部下」に引く『南州異物志』の佚文。
南州異物志曰、瑇瑁如龜、生南方海中。大者如蘧蒢、背上有鱗、大如扇。發取其鱗、因見其文。欲以作器、則煮之、因以刀截、任意所作。冷乃以梟魚皮錯治之。後以枯條木葉瑩之、乃有光耀。
ハーバード藏本。
藝文類聚卷84引南州異物志玳瑁harvard

書き下し。
南州異物志に曰く、玳瑁は龜の如し、南方の海中に生ず。大なる者は蘧蒢の如く、背上に鱗あり、大なること扇の如し。發(ひら)きて其の鱗を取り、因って其の文見ゆ。以て器をなさんと欲すれば則ちこれを煮て、因て刀を以て截り、意のなす所に任す。冷めて乃ち梟魚皮を以てこれを錯治す。後に枯條木葉を以てこれを瑩し、乃ち光耀あり。

皮錯(梟魚皮錯):鮫皮のやすり。大根おろしなどで知られる。當初「錯治」で交錯的に製作する意かと思ったが、學生が言ふには鼈甲細工は曲げて作るので、魚皮を部品として併せて成型することはないと。よっておろし器から考へれば明らかに皮錯である。『太平御覽』卷八百七「珍寶部八」では「皮籍」に作る。籍治・藉治ならば鮫皮を敷きあてるやうにこする意に解し得よう。
鮫皮おろし3
鮫皮おろし2
蘧蒢(きょじょ):むしろ。

梟魚:朝鮮・黄胤錫『頤齋亂稿』稿本第二十册、甲午(西暦1774)九月十四日の「雜志」の「玳瑁」條の眉注に曰く、「梟魚は即ち鮫魚なり」と。稿本第114葉、pdf233。
玳瑁(濟州)。古人云:身似龜、嘴如鸚鵡、牝牡一生不再交。乳卵、大如彈丸、望卵而孕。其大者如籧篨。背上有魿、大如扇、共十二葉、發魿則見文。先煮之、刀截任意。冷則以梟魚皮錯治之、以枯條木葉瑩之。
自注:
梟魚即鮫魚也。皮有石齒、甚利。亦曰䱜魚、亦曰鯊、亦沙魚。俗曰大浪셔오、即鯊魚二字古華音也。

雌雄が一生に一度しか交接しないといふのは『本草綱目』などに對する解釋である。
黃胤錫は朝鮮の實學派の儒者。
魿は鱗の別體。

『南州異物志』の文面で、甲羅が大きいといふ情報は、 
 范成大『桂海虞衡志』の十三片に通じる。

枯葉で磨いて光澤を持たせるとはどうしたことか。紙やすりの代りになるのだらうか。學生曰く、確かに職人は或る種の枯葉でこするのだといふ。

『異物志』は後の「廣韻」にも引かれるが、通常は後漢の『異物志』ではなく、三國の萬震の『南州異物志』であらう。但し確定できない。