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Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign

Beijing is buying up media outlets and training scores of foreign journalists to ‘tell China’s story well’ – as part of a worldwide propaganda campaign of astonishing scope and ambition.

By Louisa Lim and Julia Bergin

The Guardian   Fri 7 Dec 2018 06.00 GMT
(Last modified on Tue 11 Dec 2018 10.03 GMT)

As they sifted through resumes, the team recruiting for the new London hub of China’s state-run broadcaster had an enviable problem: far, far too many candidates. Almost 6,000 people were applying for just 90 jobs “reporting the news from a Chinese perspective”. Even the simple task of reading through the heap of applications would take almost two months.

For western journalists, demoralised by endless budget cuts, China Global Television Network presents an enticing prospect, offering competitive salaries to work in state-of-the-art purpose-built studios in Chiswick, west London. CGTN – as the international arm of China Central Television (CCTV) was rebranded in 2016 – is the most high-profile component of China’s rapid media expansion across the world, whose goal, in the words of President Xi Jinping, is to “tell China’s story well”. In practice, telling China’s story well looks a lot like serving the ideological aims of the state.

For decades, Beijing’s approach to shaping its image has been defensive, reactive and largely aimed at a domestic audience. The most visible manifestation of these efforts was the literal disappearance of content inside China: foreign magazines with pages ripped out, or the BBC news flickering to black when it aired stories on sensitive issues such as Tibet, Taiwan or the Tiananmen killings of 1989. Beijing’s crude tools were domestic censorship, official complaints to news organisations’ headquarters and expelling correspondents from China.

But over the past decade or so, China has rolled out a more sophisticated and assertive strategy, which is increasingly aimed at international audiences. China is trying to reshape the global information environment with massive infusions of money – funding paid-for advertorials, sponsored journalistic coverage and heavily massaged positive messages from boosters. While within China the press is increasingly tightly controlled, abroad Beijing has sought to exploit the vulnerabilities of the free press to its advantage.

In its simplest form, this involves paying for Chinese propaganda supplements to appear in dozens of respected international publications such as the Washington Post. The strategy can also take more insidious forms, such as planting content from the state-run radio station, China Radio International (CRI), on to the airwaves of ostensibly independent broadcasters across the world, from Australia to Turkey.

Meanwhile, in the US, lobbyists paid by Chinese-backed institutions are cultivating vocal supporters known as “third-party spokespeople” to deliver Beijing’s message, and working to sway popular perceptions of Chinese rule in Tibet. China is also wooing journalists from around the world with all-expenses-paid tours and, perhaps most ambitiously of all, free graduate degrees in communication, training scores of foreign reporters each year to “tell China’s story well”.

Since 2003, when revisions were made to an official document outlining the political goals of the People’s Liberation Army, so-called “media warfare” has been an explicit part of Beijing’s military strategy. The aim is to influence public opinion overseas in order to nudge foreign governments into making policies favourable towards China’s Communist party. “Their view of national security involves pre-emption in the world of ideas,” says former CIA analyst Peter Mattis, who is now a fellow in the China programme at the Jamestown Foundation, a security-focused Washington thinktank. “The whole point of pushing that kind of propaganda out is to preclude or preempt decisions that would go against the People’s Republic of China.”

Sometimes this involves traditional censorship: intimidating those with dissenting opinions, cracking down on platforms that might carry them, or simply acquiring those outlets. Beijing has also been patiently increasing its control over the global digital infrastructure through private Chinese companies, which are dominating the switchover from analogue to digital television in parts of Africa, launching television satellites and building networks of fibre-optic cables and data centres – a “digital silk road” – to carry information around the world. In this way, Beijing is increasing its grip, not only over news producers and the means of production of the news, but also over the means of transmission.

Though Beijing’s propaganda offensive is often shrugged off as clumsy and downright dull, our five-month investigation underlines the granular nature and ambitious scale of its aggressive drive to redraw the global information order. This is not just a battle for clicks. It is above all an ideological and political struggle, with China determined to increase its “discourse power” to combat what it sees as decades of unchallenged western media imperialism.

At the same time, Beijing is also seeking to shift the global centre of gravity eastwards, propagating the idea of a new world order with a resurgent China at its centre. Of course, influence campaigns are nothing new; the US and the UK, among others, have aggressively courted journalists, offering enticements such as freebie trips and privileged access to senior officials. But unlike those countries, China’s Communist party does not accept a plurality of views. Instead, for China’s leaders, who regard the press as the “eyes, ears, tongue and throat” of the Communist party, the idea of journalism depends upon a narrative discipline that precludes all but the party-approved version of events. For China, the media has become both the battlefield on which this “global information war” is being waged, and the weapon of attack.

Nigerian investigative journalist Dayo Aiyetan still remembers the phone call he received a few years after CCTV opened its African hub in Kenya in 2012. Aiyetan had set up Nigeria’s premier investigative journalism centre, and he had exposed Chinese businessmen for illegally logging forests in Nigeria. The caller had a tempting offer: take a job working for the Chinese state-run broadcaster’s new office, he was told, and you’ll earn at least twice your current salary. Aiyetan was tempted by the money and the job security, but ultimately decided against, having only just launched his centre.

As the location of the Chinese media’s first big international expansion, Africa has been a testbed. These efforts intensified after the 2008 Olympics, when Chinese leaders were frustrated with a tide of critical reporting, in particular the international coverage of the human rights and pro-Tibet protests that accompanied the torch relay around the world. The following year China announced it would spend $6.6bn strengthening its global media presence. Its first major international foray was CCTV Africa, which immediately tried to recruit highly-respected figures such as Aiyetan.

For local journalists, CCTV promised good money and the chance to “tell the story of Africa” to a global audience, without having to hew to western narratives. “The thing I like is we are telling the story from our perspective,” Kenyan journalist Beatrice Marshall said, after being poached from KTN, one of Kenya’s leading television stations. Her presence strengthened the station’s credibility, and she has continued to stress the editorial independence of the journalists themselves.

Vivien Marsh, a visiting scholar at the University of Westminster, who has studied CCTV Africa’s coverage, is sceptical about such claims. Analysing CCTV’s coverage of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in west Africa, Marsh found that 17% of stories on Ebola mentioned China, generally emphasising its role in providing doctors and medical aid. “They were trying to do positive reporting,” says Marsh. “But they lost journalistic credibility to me in the portrayal of China as a benevolent parent.” Far from telling Africa’s story, the overriding aim appeared to be emphasising Chinese power, generosity and centrality to global affairs. (As well as its English-language channel, CGTN now runs Spanish, French, Arabic and Russian channels.)

Over the past six years, CGTN has steadily increased its reach across Africa. It is displayed on televisions in the corridors of power at the African Union, in Addis Ababa, and beamed for free to thousands of rural villages in a number of African countries, including Rwanda and Ghana, courtesy of StarTimes, a Chinese media company with strong ties to the state. StarTimes’ cheapest packages bundle together Chinese and African channels, whereas access to the BBC or al-Jazeera costs more, putting it beyond the means of most viewers. In this way, their impact is to expand access to Chinese propaganda to their audience, which they claim accounts for 10m of Africa’s 24m pay-TV subscribers. Though industry analysts believe that these numbers are likely to be inflated, broadcasters are already concerned that StarTimes is edging local companies out of some African media markets. In September, the Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association warned that “If StarTimes is allowed to control Ghana’s digital transmission infrastructure and the satellite space … Ghana would have virtually submitted its broadcast space to Chinese control and content.”

For non-Chinese journalists, in Africa and elsewhere, working for Chinese state-run media offers generous remuneration and new opportunities. When CCTV launched its Washington headquarters in 2012, no fewer than five former or current BBC correspondents based in Latin America joined the broadcaster. One of them, Daniel Schweimler, who is now at al-Jazeera, said his experience there was fun and relatively trouble-free, though he didn’t think many people actually saw his stories.

But foreign journalists working at Xinhua, the state-run news agency, see their stories reaching much larger audiences. Government subsidies cover around 40% of Xinhua’s costs, and it generates income – like other news agencies, such as the Associated Press – by selling stories to newspapers around the world. “My stories were not seen by 1 million people. They were seen by 100 million people,” boasted one former Xinhua employee. (Like most of the dozens of people we interviewed, he requested anonymity to speak freely, citing fear of retribution.) Xinhua was set up in 1931, well before the Communists took power in China, and as the party mouthpiece, its jargon-laden articles are used to propagate new directives and explain shifts in party policy. Many column inches are also spent on the ponderous speeches and daily movements of Xi Jinping, whether he is meeting the Togolese president, examining oversized vegetables or casually chatting to workers at a toy-mouse factory.

Describing his work at Xinhua, the former employee said: “You’ve got to think it’s like creative writing. You’re combining journalism with a kind of creative writing.” Another former employee, Christian Claye Edwards, who worked for Xinhua news agency in Sydney between 2010 and 2014, says: “Their objectives were loud and clear, to push a distinctly Chinese agenda.” He continued: “There’s no clear goal other than to identify cracks in a system and exploit them.” One example would be highlighting the chaotic and unpredictable nature of Australian politics – which has seen six prime ministers in eight years – as a way of undermining faith in liberal democracy. “Part of my brief was to find ways to exert that influence. It was never written down, I was never given orders,” he said.

Edwards, like other former employees of China’s state-media companies, felt that the vast majority of his work was about domestic signalling, or telegraphing messages that demonstrated loyalty to the party line in order to curry favour with senior officials. Any thoughts of how his work was furthering China’s international soft power goals came a distant second. But since Edwards left in 2014, Xinhua has begun looking outwards; one sign of this is the existence of its Twitter account – followed by 11.7 million people – even though Twitter is banned in China.

Outright censorship is generally unnecessary at China’s state-run media organisations, since most journalists quickly gain a sense of which stories are deemed appropriate and what kind of spin is needed. “I recognised that we were soft propaganda tools – but not to any greater extent than for the BBC or al-Jazeera, and certainly nothing like RT,” said Daniel Schweimler, who worked for CCTV in South America for two years. “We always joked that we’d have no interference from Beijing or DC so long as the Dalai Lama never came to visit.”

When the Dalai Lama did come to visit Canada in 2012, one journalist in Xinhua’s Ottawa bureau, Mark Bourrie, was placed in a compromising position. On the day of the visit, Bourrie was told to use his parliamentary press credentials to attend the Tibetan spiritual leader’s press conference, and to find out what had happened in a closed-door meeting with the then prime minister, Stephen Harper. When Bourrie asked whether the information would be used in a piece, his boss replied that it would not. “That day I felt that we were spies,” he later wrote. “It was time to draw the line.” He returned to his office and resigned. Now a lawyer, Bourrie declined to comment for this story.

His experience is not unusual. Three separate sources who used to work at Chinese state media said that they sometimes wrote confidential reports, knowing that they would not be published on the newswire and were solely for the eyes of senior officials. Edwards – who wrote one such report on Adelaide’s urban planning – saw it as “the lowest level of research reporting for Chinese officials”, essentially providing very low-level intelligence for a government client.

That vanishingly thin line between China’s journalism, propaganda work, influence projection and intelligence-gathering is a concern to Washington. In mid-September this year, the US ordered CGTN and Xinhua to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (Fara), which compels agents representing the interests of foreign powers in a political or quasi-political capacity to log their relationship, as well as their activities and payments. Recently Donald Trump’s campaign manager, Paul Manafort, was charged for violating this act by failing to register as a foreign lobbyist in relation to his work in Ukraine. “Chinese intelligence gathering and information warfare efforts are known to involve staff of Chinese state-run media organisations,” a congressional commission noted last year.

“Making the Foreign Serve China” was one of Chairman Mao’s favoured strategies, as epitomised by his decision to grant access in the 1930s to the American journalist Edgar Snow. The resulting book, Red Star Over China, was instrumental in winning western sympathy for the Communists, whom it depicted as progressive and anti-fascist.

Eight decades on, “making the foreign serve China” is not just a case of offering insider access in return for favourable coverage, but also of using media companies staffed with foreign employees to serve the party’s interests. In 2012, during a series of press conferences in Beijing at the annual legislature, the National People’s Congress, government officials repeatedly invited questions from a young Australian woman unfamiliar to the local foreign correspondents. She was notable for her fluent Chinese and her assiduously softball questions.

It turned out that the young woman, whose name was Andrea Yu, was working for a media outlet called Global CAMG Media Group, which is headquartered in Melbourne. Set up by a local businessman, Tommy Jiang, Global CAMG’s ownership structure obscures the company’s connection to the Chinese state: it is 60% owned by a Beijing-based group called Guoguang Century Media Consultancy, which in turn is owned by the state broadcaster, China Radio International (CRI). Global CAMG, and another of Jiang’s companies, Ostar, run at least 11 radio stations in Australia, carrying CRI content and producing their own Beijing-friendly shows to sell to other community radio stations aimed at Australia’s large population of Mandarin-speakers.

After the Beijing press pack accused Yu of being a “fake foreign reporter”, who was effectively working for the Chinese government, she told an interviewer: “When I first entered my company, there’s only a certain amount of understanding I have about its connections to the government. I didn’t know it had any, for example.” She left CAMG shortly after, but the same performance was repeated at the National People’s Congress two years later with a different Chinese-speaking Australian working for CAMG, Louise Kenney, who publicly pushed back against accusations of being a shill.
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The use of foreign radio stations to deliver government-approved content is a strategy the CRI president has called jie chuan chu hai, “borrowing a boat to go out to the ocean”. In 2015, Reuters reported that Global CAMG was one of three companies running a covert network of 33 radio stations broadcasting CRI content in 14 countries. Three years on, those networks – including Ostar – now operate 58 stations in 35 countries, according to information from their websites. In the US alone, CRI content is broadcast by more than 30 outlets, according to a combative recent speech by the US vice president, Mike Pence, though it’s difficult to know who is listening or how much influence this content really has.

Beijing has also taken a similar “borrowed boats” approach to print publications. The state-run English-language newspaper China Daily has struck deals with at least 30 foreign newspapers – including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post and the UK Telegraph – to carry four- or eight-page inserts called China Watch, which can appear as often as monthly. The supplements take a didactic, old-school approach to propaganda; recent headlines include “Tibet has seen 40 years of shining success”, “Xi unveils opening-up measures” and – least surprisingly of all – “Xi praises Communist party of China members.”

'Telling China's story well': the global reach of the China Watch newspaper supplement
Print circulation of publications carrying the state-sponsored insert

guardian20171207

Figures are hard to come by, but according to one report, the Daily Telegraph is paid £750,000 annually to carry the China Watch insert once a month. Even the Daily Mail has an agreement with the government’s Chinese-language mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, which provides China-themed clickbait such as tales of bridesmaids on fatal drinking sprees and a young mother who sold her toddler to human traffickers to buy cosmetics. Such content-sharing deals are one factor behind China Daily’s astonishing expenditures in the US; it has spent $20.8m on US influence since 2017, making it the highest registered spender that is not a foreign government.

The purpose of this “borrowed boats” strategy may also be to lend credibility to the content, since it’s not clear how many readers actually bother to open these turgid, propaganda-heavy supplements. “Part of it really is about legitimation,” argues Peter Mattis. “If it’s appearing in the Washington Post, if it’s appearing in a number of other papers worldwide, then in a sense it’s giving credibility to those views.”

In September, Donald Trump criticised this practice, claiming China was pushing “false messages” intended to damage his prospects in the midterm elections. His wrath was directed at a China Watch supplement in the Iowa-based Des Moines Register, designed to undermine farm-country support for a trade war. He tweeted: “China is actually placing propaganda ads in the Des Moines Register and other papers, made to look like news. That’s because we are beating them on Trade, opening markets, and the farmers will make a fortune when this is over!”

In the Xi Jinping era, propaganda has become a business. In a 2014 speech, propaganda tsar Liu Qibao endorsed this approach, stating that other countries have successfully used market forces to export their cultural products. The push to monetise propaganda provides canny businesspeople with opportunities to curry favour at high levels, either through partnering with state-run media companies or bankrolling Chinese proxies overseas. The favoured strategy now is not just “borrowing foreign boats” but buying them outright, as the University of Canterbury’s Anne-Marie Brady has written.

The most visible example of this came in 2015, when China’s richest man acquired the South China Morning Post (SCMP), a 115-year-old Hong Kong paper once known for its editorial independence and tough reporting. Jack Ma, whose Alibaba e-commerce empire is valued at $420bn, has not denied suggestions that he was asked by mainland authorities to make the purchase. “If I had to bother about what other people speculated about, how would I get anything done?” he said in December 2015. Around the same time, Alibaba’s executive vice-chairman Joseph Tsai made clear that under new ownership, the SCMP would provide an alternative view of China to the one found in western media: “A lot of journalists working with these western media organisations may not agree with the system of governance in China and that taints their view of coverage. We see things differently, we believe things should be presented as they are,” Tsai told an interviewer.

The task of executing that mission has fallen to 35-year-old CEO Gary Liu, a Mandarin-speaking California native with a Harvard degree, who had previously worked as chief executive of the digital news aggregator Digg and before that, on the business side of the music streaming company Spotify. When we spoke via Skype, Liu sounded a little bit uncomfortable when asked how well the SCMP is fulfilling Tsai’s vision. “The owners have their set of language, and the newspaper has our convictions,” he said. “And our conviction is that our job is to cover China with objectivity, and to do our best to show both sides of a very, very complicated story.” The paper’s role, as he sees it, is “to lead the global conversation about China.” And to achieve that goal, Liu is being given significant resources. Staffers talk of “staggering” expenditures, with one employee describing the number of new hires “like the cast of Ben Hur”.

Even under new ownership, the SCMP treads a delicate line on China, continuing to run granular political analysis and original reporting on sensitive issues such as human rights lawyers and religious crackdowns. Though pages are free from Xinhua copy, cynics joke the paper itself is transmogrifying into a kind of China Daily-lite, with increasing prominence given to stories about Xi Jinping, pro-Beijing editorials and politically on-message opinion pieces. All this is combined with constant, fawning coverage of owner Jack Ma, memorably described by the paper as a “modern-day Confucius”.

Two stories in particular have been heavily criticised. First, in 2016, it published an interview with a young human rights activist named Zhao Wei, who had disappeared into police custody a year before. In the interview, the activist’s quotes, recanting her past behaviour, were reminiscent of Mao-era “self-criticism”. Fears she had spoken under duress were confirmed a year later, when she admitted she’d given her “candid confession” after being held in a heavily monitored cell for a year – “No talking. No walking. Our hands, feet, our posture … every body movement was strictly limited,” she wrote.

Then, earlier this year, the SCMP accepted a “government-arranged interview” with bookseller Gui Minhai. Gui, a Swedish citizen, was one of five sellers of politically sensational books who disappeared in 2015 – in his case from his home in Thailand – and then reappeared in police custody in China in 2016. The SCMP interview was conducted in a detention facility, with Gui flanked by security guards.

But Liu is adamant that the paper has not made any missteps on his watch. He says the paper was invited – not forced – to cover these stories. In Gui’s case, he insists the decision was based on journalistic merit: “The senior editorial leadership team got together, and said: This is important for us to show up. If not, there’s a very high likelihood that the other stories reported do not share the entire situation. In fact, a lot of the other reports did not mention the fact that there were security guards standing on either side of Gui Minhai at the start and at the end of the interviews.” Liu stressed that “there is a significant difference between how we reported it, and how we would expect state propaganda to report it.” But many in Hong Kong were distressed that a journal once seen as a paper of record was effectively running a forced confession on behalf of the Chinese state.

To insiders, even the paper’s hardhitting coverage of China forms part of a broader strategy. “It’s all smoke and mirrors,” longtime contributor Stephen Vines said. “It’s so pernicious because a lot of is quite plausible.” In November, Vines issued a public statement announcing he will no longer write for the paper. A current SCMP journalist described “a veneer of press freedom”, noting, “It’s not so much that pieces are pulled and changed. It’s where they’re positioned, how they’re promoted. The digital revolution has made that all very easy to do. You write whatever you want, but the people control what we see.” The SCMP has countered public criticism of censorship aggressively, even running a column in which a senior editor blamed censorship accusations on “butthurt ex-Post employees with axes to grind”.

Chinese money is also being invested in print media far from home, including in South Africa, where companies linked to the Chinese state have a 20% stake in Independent Media, the country’s second-largest media group, which runs 20 prominent newspapers. In cases like this, Beijing’s impact on day-to-day operations can be minimal, but there are still things that cannot be said, as one South African journalist, Azad Essa, recently discovered when he used his column, which ran in a number of newspapers published by Independent Media, to criticise Beijing’s mass internment of Uighurs. Hours later, his column had been cancelled. The company blamed a redesign of the paper, which had necessitated changes in the columnists used.

But Essa pulled no punches in a piece he subsequently wrote for Foreign Policy: “Red lines are thick and non-negotiable. Given the economic dependence on the Chinese and crisis in newsrooms, this is rarely confronted. And this is precisely the type of media environment that China wants their African allies to replicate.” This is true not just in Africa, but for China’s media interests across the world.

These days Australia has come to be seen as a petri dish for Chinese influence overseas. At the heart of the row is a controversial Chinese billionaire, Huang Xiangmo, whose links to Labor party politician Sam Dastyari precipitated Dastyari’s resignation in 2017. Three years earlier, Huang provided A$1.8m of seed funding to establish the Australia China Relations Institute, a thinktank based at the University of Technology Sydney. ACRI, which is led by former foreign minister Bob Carr, aims to promote “a positive and optimistic view of Australia-China relations”.

In the past two years, ACRI has spearheaded a programme organising study tours to China for at least 28 high-profile Australian journalists, whisking them on all-expenses tours with extraordinary access. Many of the breathless resulting articles – footnoting their status as “guests of ACRI” or “guests of the All China Journalist Association” – accord remarkably closely with Beijing’s strategic priorities. As well as paeans to China’s modernity and size, the articles advise Australians not to turn their backs on China’s One Belt One Road initiative, and not to publicly criticise China’s policy towards the South China Sea, or anything else for that matter.

Close observers believe the scheme is tilting China coverage in Australia. Economist Stephen Joske briefed the first ACRI tour on the country’s economic challenges, and was dismayed at the largely uncritical tone of their coverage. “Australian elites have very little real exposure to China,” he said. “There is a vacuum of informed commentary and they [ACRI-sponsored journalists] have filled it with very, very one-sided information.”

Participants on the study tours do not downplay their influence. “I found the trip fantastic”, says one reporter who asked not to be named. “In Australia, the reporting often doesn’t go beyond having a one-party communist system. There’s a lot of positive things happening in China in terms of technology, business and trade, and that doesn’t get a lot of positive coverage.” Others treat the trips with more caution. “You go on these trips knowing you’re going to be getting their point of view,” says the ABC’s economics correspondent Peter Ryan, who went on an ACRI-sponsored trip in 2016.

ACRI responded to our questions about the trips by issuing a statement, saying that its tours “pale into insignificance” compared with similar trips organised by the US and Israel. A spokesman wrote: “Not for a moment has ACRI ever lobbied journalists about what they write. They are free to take whatever position they want.” The spokesman also confirmed that in-kind support to the trips has been given by the All-China Journalists Association, a Communist party body whose mission is to “tell China’s stories well, spread China’s voice”. For his part, Huang Xiangmo said he has no involvement in ACRI’s operations.

ACRI is a relatively new player in this game. Since 2009, the China-United States Exchange Foundation (Cusef), headed by Hong Kong’s millionaire former chief executive Tung Chee-hwa, has taken 127 US journalists from 40 US outlets to China, as well as congressmen and senators. Since Tung has an official position – vice-chairman of the Chinese government advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – Cusef is registered as a “foreign principal” under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (Fara).

A picture of how Cusef has worked to sway coverage of China inside the US can be found in Fara filings by a PR firm working for the foundation since 2009. BLJ Worldwide, which has also represented Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, the Gaddafi family, and Qatar’s World Cup bid, organised journalist tours and cultivated a number of what it calls “third-party supporters” to marshal positive coverage of China in the US. In one year alone, 2010, BLJ’s target was to place an average of three articles per week in the US media, in venues such as the Wall Street Journal, for which it was paid around $20,000 a month. In a memo from November 2017, BLJ lists eight recommended third-party supporters who, it claimed, “can engage by writing their own op-eds, providing endorsements of Cusef, and potentially speaking to select media”. Fara filings also show that in 2010, BLJ discussed how to influence the way US schoolchildren are taught about China’s much-criticised role in Tibet. After conducting a review of four high-school textbooks, BLJ proposed “a strong, factual counter-narrative be introduced to defend and promote the actions of China within the Tibet Autonomous Region”.

Over the past decade, Cusef has widened its remit, mooting ambitious cultural diplomacy plans to influence the US public. According to a January 2018 memo, one of the schemes included a plan to build a Chinese “town called Gung-Ho in Detroit”. The memo suggests redeveloping an entire city block to showcase Chinese innovation using design elements from both countries, with a budget of $8-10m. The memo even suggests shooting a reality TV show following the progress of the Gung-Ho community as “a living metaphor for the promise of the US-China relationship”. Given Detroit’s parlous state, the memo concludes, “It will be very difficult for the news media to be critical of the project.”

Cusef responded to questions about its activities with a statement, saying: “Cusef has supported projects which enhance the communication and understanding between peoples of US and China. All of our programmes and activities operate within the framework of the laws and we are fully committed to carrying out our work by maintaining the highest standard of integrity.” BLJ did not respond to requests for comment.

China’s active courtship of journalists extends well beyond short-term study tours to encompass longer-term programmes for reporters from developing countries. These moves were formalised under the auspices of the China Public Diplomacy Association, established in 2012. The targets are extraordinarily ambitious: the training of 500 Latin American and Caribbean journalists over five years, and 1,000 African journalists a year by 2020.

Through these schemes, foreign reporters are schooled not just on China, but also on its view of journalism. To China’s leaders, journalistic ideals such as critical reporting and objectivity are not just hostile, they pose an existential threat. One leaked government directive, known as Document 9, even defines the ultimate goal of the western media as to “gouge an opening through which to infiltrate our ideology”. This gulf in journalistic values was further underlined in a series of CGTN videos issued last year, featuring prominent Chinese journalists accusing non-Chinese practitioners of being “brainwashed” by “western values of journalism”, which are depicted as irresponsible and disruptive to society. One Xinhua editor, Luo Jun, argues in favour of censorship, saying, “We have to take responsibility for what we report. If that’s being considered as censorship, I think it’s good censorship.”

With its fellowships for foreign reporters, Beijing is moving to train a young generation of international journalists. A current participant in this programme is Filipino journalist Greggy Eugenio, who is finishing up an all-expenses-paid media fellowship for reporters from countries participating in China’s grand global infrastructure push, the Belt and Road Initiative. For 10 months, Eugenio has been studying and travelling around China on organised tours, as well as doing a six-week internship at state-run television. Twice a week he attends classes on language, culture, politics and new media at Beijing’s Renmin University of China, as he works towards a master’s degree in communication.

“This programme continuously opens my mind and heart on a lot of misconceptions I’ve known about China,” Eugenio said in an email. “I’ve learned that a state-owned government media is one of the most effective means of journalism. The media in China is still working well and people here appreciate their work.” Throughout his time in China, he has been filing stories for the state-run Philippine News Agency, and when he finishes next month he will return to his position writing for the presidential communication team of Filipino president Rodrigo Duterte.

Some observers argue the expansion of authoritarian propaganda networks – such as Russia’s RT and Iran’s Press TV – has been overhyped, with little real impact on global journalism. But Beijing’s play is bigger and more multifaceted. At home, it is building the world’s biggest broadcaster by combining its three mammoth radio and television networks into a single body, the Voice of China. At the same time, a reshuffle has transferred responsibility for the propaganda machinery from state bodies to the Communist party, which effectively tightens party control over the message. Overseas, capitalising on the move from analogue to digital broadcasting, it has used proxies likesuch as StarTimes to increase its control over global telecommunications networks, while building out new digital highways. “The real brilliance of it is not just trying to control all content – it’s the element of trying to control the key nodes in the information flow,” says Freedom House’s Sarah Cook. “It might not be necessarily clear as a threat now, but once you’ve got control over the nodes of information you can use them as you want.”

Such blatant exhibitions of power indicate the new mood of assertiveness. In information warfare – as in so much else – Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim of “hide your strength and bide your time” is over. As the world’s second-largest economy, China has decided it needs discourse power commensurate with its new global stature. Last week, a group of the US’s most distinguished China experts released a startling report expressing concern over China’s more aggressive projections of power. Many of the experts have spent decades promoting engagement with China, yet they conclude: “The ambition of Chinese activity in terms of the breadth, depth of investment of financial resources, and intensity requires far greater scrutiny than it has been getting.”

As Beijing and its proxies extend their reach, they are harnessing market forces to silence the competition. Discourse power is, it seems, a zero-sum game for China, and voices that are critical of Beijing are co-opted or silenced, left without a platform or drowned out in the sea of positive messaging created by Beijing’s own “borrowed” and “bought” boats. As the west’s media giants flounder, China’s own media imperialism is on the rise, and the ultimate battle may not be for the means of news production, but for journalism itself.


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1982年、臺灣訪問。ソルジェニーツィン「臺灣の若者はチャイナと戰へ!アメリカはチャイナ共産黨のウソに騙されてゐる!」

天國で「ピルズベリーごときが今頃騷いでも遲い」と嘆いてゐるだらう。


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索忍尼辛在自由中國,索忍尼辛在中山堂演講  
吳三連文藝基金會主辦索忍尼辛演講會,4點報告。1、今天演講長度前後共50分鐘,2、索忍尼辛不回答問題,3、請了教授王兆彬做翻譯,4、感謝新聞局提供的協助。
(索忍尼辛在自由中國,索忍尼辛在中山堂演講/索忍尼辛演講)

和人民生活各方面都有顯著的成就,並且顯示出如果大陸不淪入敵人之手,國家的力量一定會朝向同樣明確的方向發展,我總覺得是人會認清這種含有教訓意義的比較。會清楚的看到,凡是逃離共黨的人民是多麼繁榮,而陷入共黨統下的人民卻有千百萬人慘死,共產黨在蘇俄,在波蘭,在寮國的殘暴史實,早已為大家所熟知,至於在中央,在越南在北韓,千百萬生靈被摧毀的史賓相信早晚也會很詳盡地被揭開,即使在今天,我們仍然能從一些蛛絲馬跡中推斷出來,其實並不如此,事實上自由中竟受到其他國家,非常不公平和不平等的待遇,世界上大多數的國家都不顧道義,把你們逼出聯合國,自從他們把1700萬自由中國人,排除聯合國之門後,這些代表雖然仍在那裡繼續叫囂,唏噓,吶喊著可是聯合國卻以便成了一個,不負責任滑稽劇場而自取其辱了,在這裡,第三世界,許多國家也向喪失理性的瘋子一般。扮演著跳樑小丑,他們不知道自由的真諦,而坐待壓迫桎悎得到來,至於西方世界若干世紀以來,早已熟知自由的真諦,可是由於長久以來,生活在幸福安樂之中,他們為自由所付出的,有愈來愈少的傾向,西方人一項珍視自己的國家的體制「自由民主」,但是為保衛這一體制,挺身而出的人愈來愈少了,西方保衛自己能力正一個年代不如一個年代地衰退,喪失中,一個國家接著一個國家的背叛行為,只是為了自身的苟安,這種現象在二次大戰前就已經開始了,到戰後,更不惜出賣了整個東歐,只是為了能夠使自己的幸福生活持續的更久一些,波蘭米可拉伊奇科政權多麼輕易地被出賣了,同樣地,自己的戰時盟友蔣介石也被輕易地出賣了,不久的將來我們也會看到一個西方國家。只是為了茍全自己而出賣另一個國家,大多數恐懼共黨的西方國家為了怕激怒中共,甚至於不敢出售武器給貴國;你們對這點會感到驚奇嗎?事實上,他們對自由的維護和關懷根本是微不足道的,目前飽受威脅的歐洲最可能了解這種情況,可是怎麼都害怕承認中華民國和鄭遭受威脅的亞州國家呢?不久前日本首相曾經說過,如果武裝自由中國,會給遠東帶來不安,可是真如此的話,那還有什麼可說的呢?他們不斷地尋求苟安之道,選擇自己的替身而置身事外,並且創初一個迷人的神話說:有「壞」的共產主義,也有「好」的共產主義,利用這個神話,把中共塑造成一個本質善良的和平締造者。當南韓目前免於遭受共黨攻擊之際,又產生了一種神話,也不足為奇;誤認為蘇俄並不仇恨他們,蘇俄不像北韓那樣是南韓的直接敵人,現在他們為了盡量討好北京。而正在搖擺佈定,是不是該把中共投誠的飛機交給自由中國呢?這種神話的來源,並不足由於他們,沒有遠見或是愚蠢,而是由於絕望和精神喪失的緣故,美國對貴國的關係是很特殊的,到今天為止,美國的唯一保證就是使台灣不受共黨攻擊,可是今天美國要保持對台灣的忠實承諾有多困難呢?要知道它對貴國的承諾已經喪失泰半,美國也以屈服於世界上普遍的逆流,要背棄台灣陷自由中國的命運於為難的境地。而不惜背叛許多自由國家。正因如此,他們欣然響應中共和平統一的虛偽建議,許多美國記者大聲疾呼,目前「北京」一定會遵守。實踐和平統一的諾言,可是他們完全忘記了,共產黨人已經不只一次地欺騙了世人,戰後東歐若干政府和共黨聯合的經驗並沒有給世人留下任何教訓,而現在這種。沒有希望的聯合政府的試驗,又在寮國重演,同樣地,在季辛吉和北越簽訂合約之後。世人一直到北越決定侵占越南那天為止,都還相信北越會遵守諾言的住的美國傳播媒體,設置愚蠢到這種程度,意然說美國並沒有犯任何錯誤,如果說中共違反諾言,以武力侵占台灣,那時美國又將可不受義務的約束,而再度開始運送武器,到那時武器交給誰呢?這種囈語竟然出現在美國很都多主要的報章上,他們這樣做究竟為了什麼?恐怕連他們自己都不明白吧!美國有權威的人士竟想迫使台灣去做投降式的談判,讓台灣自願地獻出自己的自由和力量。中共到底想向你們要些什麼呢?當然他們渴望侵佔你們繁榮的經濟,掠奪和吞時你們的一切再經歷了20世紀許多大事件之後,只有一些短視無知的人,才會相信「北京」的諾言,認為他們會完全保留你們的經濟社會制度,甚至你們的武裝力量,同時讓你們也保留某些自由的要素,對他們來說主要的並不在於要剝奪你們的財物,剽竊你們辛苦得來的果實而是在於不管在什麼地方,也不管是什麼事情,共黨制度也都不能容忍有一點點的偏差,與其說,它所需要的事富足的寶島,毋寧說它需要抑制,脫離它制度的偏差,因為讓其他的中國「指大陸同胞」知道由沒有共產主義。中共所不能容忍的是你們經濟和社會的優勢,可能生活得更好,那是不可以的,在共黨的意識形勢裡,是不容許有任何自由島嶼存在的,所以就連,他們也千方百計地制止銷售給他們,以便削弱你們的戰鬥力量,破壞海峽的均勢,使他們入侵台灣的日期提早來臨,為了促使美國漠視台灣,中共已開始利用它和蘇俄的和解,「玩蘇俄牌」而這種和解並不是完全故作姿勢,而是有其遠景的,因為兩個共黨政權畢竟是出自同一根源的,有一件事現在大家早已忘記了哪就是,1923年,蘇俄的代表魯金別格--化名「鮑羅亭」。曾經準備在中國發動共產主義的政變,因此,他才把毛澤東,周恩來提升到黨內最高地位,我在此之所以把這些奉告各位乃是由於你們你們所面臨的事致命的威脅,幸好這一點在台灣的人工,即使並全部。但大多數人都很了解,你們對這種威脅的了解顯然的比南韓要好得多,在南韓,年輕的一代和大學生,完全忘了共黨侵略所帶來短暫的恐懼,而覺得他們所享有的自由似乎太少,可是,一但當他們兩守被縛被押送共黨集中營的時候,他們就會懷念和重估今天他們所謂「不自由」的價值,在西方似乎流行著一種潮流,那就是向站在反共前線的國家,伺在敵人炮火威脅下的國家,要求廣泛的民主,不只是普通的民主,而是絕對的放任,以及背叛國和任意破壞國家的權利,西方國家不僅允許這些行為在他們自己的國家發生,而且更要求每一個受敵人威脅的國家,包括貴國在內也要付出同樣的代價;所幸。在台灣我覺得大家對這種行為都能有理性的節制。這都是為了在反共鬥爭中能夠堅持下去的緣故,可是,另一個危險正在虎視眈眈地環伺著,貴國的經濟成就和民生富裕具有雙重特性,一方它是全中國人明光明希望的所寄,另一方面它也可能顯露出你們的弱點,因為所有生活富裕的人們容易喪失對危機的警覺,沉緬於今日的生活,結果可能喪失了抗敵意志。我希望並且呼籲你們,能夠揚棄這一弱點。在你們物質生活有所成就的時候,不要讓你們的青年懦弱到寧願做敵人的俘虜和奴隸,也不願意去戰鬥你們在台灣33年的和平生活,並不意味今後3年你們不會遭受攻擊,你們不是生活在一各無憂無慮的寶島上,你們應該全國皆兵,因為你們不斷受著戰爭的威脅,你們1800萬的人口,所面臨問題的深度,正如同猶太人一樣,但是猶太人的問題,曾引起許多國家的注意,而成為當今世界的中心問題,你們的特殊情況,跟猶太人比較一下,我不理解為什麼台灣命運不能博得世界的注意呢?當前世界出賣弱者的現象甚囂塵上,說實在的,你們只有依賴你們自己本身的力量,可是你們也有一個更大更光明的希望,那就市被奴役國家的人民,不會無限度的忍耐下去,當他們的統治者們面臨嚴重危機的時候,他們就會揭竿而起來推翻暴政。在我閱讀過你們許多書籍當中,瞭解到你們的寶島,乃是民族復興的基地,但願它是!自救和防衛部應該是你們最後的目標,你們最後的目標應該是幫助和姐就你們在大陸受難的同班,首先,最要的是盡量而勇敢的運用你們的廣播和電視的傳播功能。似乎在別人的心目中無法指出誰是你們堅強可靠的盟友,但是你們面臨危亡之際,你們會有全世界最堅強的盟邦,那就示億萬的中國人,他們的同情與支持。就是你們的精神和士氣的最大支柱,就在幾天前,你們就收到了一個具有鼓舞性的信號。那就是唾棄共產暴政的中共飛行員架使飛機抵南韓,投奔自由,這正是表現了中國大陸人民嚮往自由的真正情感,我常常很痛心地想,中國「古拉格群島」裡許多無名的囚犯,他們的苦難也許要到21世紀才能向世人宣洩,所有被壓迫的人民,包括蘇俄人民在內,都不能依賴外界的援助,為有依靠自己的力量。如果發狂的中共和蘇俄的統治者之間發動了戰爭,整各世界都會作壁上觀的,說不定他們內心還會感到莫大的安慰,我但願這件事情不會發生,但是不管怎樣,讓我門在此位中國人和俄國人間的友好和信任作見證,甚至於在任何情況下,我們之間都不要有矛盾存在;進一步來說,我門受迫害的兩國人民應該聯合起來共同對抗2個共產政權,不管2個貪婪的。反人民的專制政權發生什麼事情,讓我門兩國人民保持互相了解,互相同情和友誼,決不讓無益的民族仇很蒙蔽了耳目,我門不知道共產主義會為禍世界多久,記得有人曾經在135年前,誇耀著向當時若干大帝國的領袖們說過,再歐洲所組成的一小撮烏托邦共產黨徒們,會用鐵和血征服這些領袖,並使他們屈膝而喪失他們的權威和驕傲,可是這些領袖對他這種狂言都認為不值一孝,因為像這樣的預言,他們認為沒有力量。共產黨的力量原本是壓榨和殘酷,而西方世界的弱點在於缺乏戰鬥的意志,我門不知道人類歷史還要走多少稀奇古怪的曲折道路,我曾經表達了我自己的推測,全世界的共產主義思想,或許比蘇俄和中共的共產主義制度存在得更久,還可能會蔓延到其他國家,因為在哪裡願意嘗試共產主義的人很多,不過在我門兩國國民的意識裡,理性的體認很佔優勢,儘管兩國人民飽經苦難喪失甚多,畢竟正在邁向自就和復興的道路。
http://city.udn.com/66275/5108155


To Free China 'Showing the world the difference'
Publication Date: December 01, 1984

"But the main issue is not to steal away your wealth, to steal the fruits of your hard work. The main thing is that the Communist system does not tolerate any deviation in anything or anywhere." (File Photo)
... a statement on the condition of a divided world -
                 by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

For 33 years, Taiwan, I believe, has attracted, by its specific fate, the attention of many people throughout the world. I myself felt that way long ago. About thirty countries have already fallen under the yoke of Communism. Scarcely one of them has been fortunate enough to retain even a tiny patch of its independent national territory, where its state authority could continue to develop despite the disruption, and through comparison show the world the difference between itself and Communist disorganization. In Russia, such a patch of land could have been Wrangel's Crimea. But lacking any external support and abandoned by its unfaithful former allies, it was soon crushed by the Communists. But in China, thanks to a wide Strait, a fragment of the former state became the Republic of China on Taiwan, which, for a third of a century, has proved to the world what heights of development could have been reached if the whole of China had not fallen under the yoke of Communism. Today, the Republic of China on Taiwan differs from the other in its development, its industrial achievements and the well-being of its population, thereby proving how logically the forces of a nation can be guided, if they are not in inimical hands.

It would seem that the population of our planet should clearly perceive such an instructive comparison and should have its eyes opened to see how peoples who escape Communism flourish and how those who fall victim to Communist tenets perish by the millions. The history of Communist destructions in the Soviet Union, Poland and Cambodia are now known to all. The history of the millions destroyed in China, Vietnam or North Korea is yet to be revealed in detail, but many signs allow us to judge this history even now.

But NO! It is Free China which has had to endure and suffer from the greatest injustices and ignoble attitudes of other countries. The United Nations, long degraded to an irresponsible side show, disgraced itself by expelling from membership the 17 millions of Free China. The majority of countries on our planet treacherously expelled your country from the U.N., whose delegates, adding insult to injury, whistled, jeered and shouted. The majority of Third World countries behaved like madmen who don't know the price of freedom but are themselves waiting for the kick of the boot.

For centuries the Western World has known very well the price of freedom. But with years passing and well being achieved, it is less and less pre pared to pay for it. The Western people value their state systems but are less and less inclined to defend them with their own bodies. From decade to decade, the West has become increasingly senile and unable to defend itself. The betrayal of one country after another had already begun before the Second World War. Afterward, no scruples were felt in abrogating the whole of Eastern Europe just for the sake of the West's own well-being. How easy it was to betray the government of Mikolaychik; how easy it was to withdraw support from one's ally, Chiang Kai-shek. And soon we shall witness how one country will betray another for the price of surviving just a little longer. Should it be surprising that the majority of the frightened Western countries are even afraid to sell you weapons for fear of angering Peking. That's how much their drive and concern for freedom is worth. Meanwhile, threatened Europe should understand your position better but is so cowardly that it fails to recognize that the Republic of China and other countries of Asia are themselves endangered. Just recently, the former premier of Japan declared that the arming of Free China would destabilize the Far East! What more can be said?

They are all obsessed with the search for self-protection and the quest for a stand-in. So there emerged an attractive myth-that there are "bad" and "good" Communisms. And out of such a myth grew the image of Communist China as a good-natured peacemaker! But should that be surprising-when in South Korea, which herself survived a Communist assault, there exists a myth that actually the Soviet Union is not directly hostile to them, not so much an enemy, not like North Korea. The South Koreans have also been doing their utmost to curry favor with Peking. Now they are hesitating about whether to give a defecting Red Chinese aircraft to Free China.

No, it is not out of shortsightedness, not out of stupidity, that such myths are believed, but out of despair, out of the loss of spirit.

In a particular relationship to you is the United States of America. Up to this day, the United States provides the only outside guaranty restraining the Communists from attacking your island. But how difficult it becomes for the United States to remain faithful to Taiwan; how much has already been lost on the way! The Americans have also succumbed to the general world trend to leave the Republic of China to its perils, to abandon it to its fate. America moved to abrogate its diplomatic relations with the R.O.C. For what? For what fault of hers? Only to follow the futile Western dream of gaining an ally in Communist China. America has restricted its connections with you, curtailed its military support and is denying you much of what you need.

What pressures have been exerted upon American presidents, urging surrender of Taiwan! Not all of them could bear the strain. Here we have a former president, just back from a visit to China, where he flattered his hosts by saying that "a strong Communist China is a guarantee for peace" and that America seems to be interested in a strong Red China. Such people in former years have governed the United States and there is no guarantee that another such person might not succeed President Reagan.

The United States is highly heterogeneous. There are many currents, of which the capitulatory tides are quite powerful. Extremely powerful circles are leaning toward betrayal of a free country in favor of a friendship with a totalitarian one. They gladly picked up the hypocritical offer from Communist China on "peaceful unification." Many American journalists cry from the housetops that Peking is now "bound by promises" to effect unification peacefully. They wanted to forget, and therefore successfully forgot, how many times the Communists have already cheated. The experience of "governments in concert with Communists" in postwar Eastern Europe has taught no lesson. This hope less experiment now is being conducted in Cambodia. Similarly, according to Kissinger's agreement, North Vietnam was "bound by a ceasefire"-until it set the day for the seizure of South Vietnam. And leading American newsmen reached such heights of stupidity as to write that the United States doesn't make mistakes. If Red China "breaks its promise" and seizes Taiwan by force then-only then-America would be freed from obligations and could again start to deliver arms ... to whom, then? ... Yes, such delirium appears on the pages of leading American newspapers, and they don't realize what they are doing!

And thus the influential circles in the United States want to force Taiwan to accept capitulatory negotiations, to relinquish voluntarily its freedom and power.

What, then, does Communist China want from you? Certainly, it is eager to grab your blossoming economy, to plunder and devour it. After all that has happened in the 20th century, only shortsighted simpletons can trust Peking's promises that it will totally preserve your economic and social system, and even your armed forces along with some elements of freedom. But the main issue is not to take away your wealth, to steal the fruits of your hard work. The main thing is that the Communist system does not tolerate any deviation in anything or anywhere. Not even the wealth of your island is important. What matters is the deviation from their system. Communist China hates you for your economic and social superiority. For them it is not permissible that other Chinese should know that there can be a better life without Communism. The Communist ideology does not tolerate any islets of freedom. And so, with all their might, the Communists want to cut off the sale to you even of defensive arms, to try to weaken your defense capability, to disturb your balance of power in the Straits-and thus to bring closer the day of intrusion into your island.

In order to nurture the apathy of the United States, Red China plays speculatively on the negotiations between Peking and Moscow on matters of China Soviet rapprochement. Such rapprochement is not make-believe. It is a very realistic perspective. Both governments have long had common roots, a fact which everybody seems to forget. As far back as 1923, a Soviet agent Grusemberg, alias "Borodin," prepared a Communist coup, and it was he who promoted Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-Iai to the highest positions in the party.

All that I am telling you - because of the deadly danger in which you find your self-is understood well by many, if not yet by all. The threat is understood better here than in South Korea, where the young generation, the college students, have quite forgotten the brief horrors of Communist intrusion, so that the present freedom seems to them not enough. But they will remember and revalue their present "non-freedom" when, after a command "hands back," they are driven under armed guards into concentration camps.

It seems to be fashionable in the West to demand from all who stand in the forefront of defense, under machine gun fire, to demand the widest democracy, and not just simple, but absolute democracy, bordering on total dissolute ness, on state treason, on the right to destroy their own state and country-such freedom as Western countries tolerate. Such is the price the West demands from each menaced country, including yours. But it seems that on your island the logical limits are known and will sustain your struggle.

There is another danger stalking you. Your economic successes, your living standards and well-being are o(a two-fold nature. These are the bright hope of all the Chinese people. But they also can become your weakness.

All prosperous people tend to lose the aware ness of danger, an addiction of the good living conditions of today, and consequently lose their will for resistance. I hope and I urge you to avoid such a weakening. Don't. permit the youth of your country to become soft and placid, to become slaves to material goods, until finally they will prefer captivity and slavery to the struggle for freedom. That for 33 years you lived peacefully does not mean that 'you might 'not be attacked in the following three years. You are not a serene, care-free island; you are an army, constantly under the menace of war.

document p6

Nobel laureate Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn receives a copy of the historical work Soviet Russia in China by Chiang Kai-shek from Government Information Office Director General Dr. James C.Y. Soong, as Adm.,Ma Chi-chuang, Secretary-General to the President, looks on. (File photo)

You are 18 millions, about as many as there are Jews in the world, and your problem is of the same dimensions. But the Jewish problem attracts the attention of all states and has become one of the central problems of contemporary times. Comparing this with the uniqueness of your position, I don't perceive why the fate of Taiwan should not command the equal attention of the world.

But in today's world betrayal from weakness reigns supreme, and it is only your own strength upon which you can really rely. But there is also one bigger and brighter hope: the peoples of the enslaved nations, who will not endure indefinitely but who will rise in one menacing hour-menacing to their Communist rulers.

In your books you write that your island is a "bastion of national recovery." So be it! Not only defense, not only self preservation should be your goal-'but help, but the liberation of your compatriots suffering on the mainland, and first of all, through free and courageous radio broadcasts.

It may seem, since no one comes to mind, that you have no firm, reliable allies, although they might appear in the hour of destruction. But you have the most formidable ally in the world: one billion Chinese people. Their sympathy is your moral and spiritual support. Just a few days ago, you had an encouraging signal from your compatriots through the act of defection of a Red Chinese air force pilot. Often I think of still anonymous prisoners of the Chinese Gulags whose true story might not be told until the 21st century.

All the oppressed people, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, cannot rely on outside help, only on their own strength. At the best, the whole world would watch indifferently, but possibly with a great deal of relief, if the mad rulers of China and the USSR should unleash war among them. I hope that won't happen. But in any case, let us testify here and now to the mutual amicability and trust between the Chinese and Russian peoples, to the absence of contradictions amongst them; even more, let us hope for a union of our long suffering compatriots against both Communist governments. Whatever might happen between these two self-interested, anti national governments, let us preserve mutual understanding, mutual compassion and friendship; let's not allow them to blind our eyes and deaden our ears through fruitless national hatred.

We don't know how long the plague of Communism will affect our world. One hundred and thirty-five years ago, who would have told the leaders of the then great empires that the tiny group of utopians-Communists who organized themselves in Europe - would conquer them all with iron and blood, and force to their knees their might and pride? They would not even have smiled at such a prophecy. Such forces could not then be seen anywhere. The strength of the Communists was based on their drive and their cruelty; the weakness of the West was rooted in the absence of the will to fight.

We don't know what whimsical zigzags human history will follow. I have al ready expressed a supposition that world Communism will outlive both Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes and spread over other countries, many of which are still eager to experience Communism. But in our two countries nation al commonsense shall finally prevail! Anyway, both our peoples have suffered too much, lost too much! They are already moving along the way of liberation and recovery!

https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=4&post=5056



大學院授業。
初唐の『藝文類聚』卷八十四「寶玉部下」に引く『南州異物志』の佚文。
南州異物志曰、瑇瑁如龜、生南方海中。大者如蘧蒢、背上有鱗、大如扇。發取其鱗、因見其文。欲以作器、則煮之、因以刀截、任意所作。冷乃以梟魚皮錯治之。後以枯條木葉瑩之、乃有光耀。
ハーバード藏本。
藝文類聚卷84引南州異物志玳瑁harvard

書き下し。
南州異物志に曰く、玳瑁は龜の如し、南方の海中に生ず。大なる者は蘧蒢の如く、背上に鱗あり、大なること扇の如し。發(ひら)きて其の鱗を取り、因って其の文見ゆ。以て器をなさんと欲すれば則ちこれを煮て、因て刀を以て截り、意のなす所に任す。冷めて乃ち梟魚皮を以てこれを錯治す。後に枯條木葉を以てこれを瑩し、乃ち光耀あり。

皮錯(梟魚皮錯):鮫皮のやすり。大根おろしなどで知られる。當初「錯治」で交錯的に製作する意かと思ったが、學生が言ふには鼈甲細工は曲げて作るので、魚皮を部品として併せて成型することはないと。よっておろし器から考へれば明らかに皮錯である。『太平御覽』卷八百七「珍寶部八」では「皮籍」に作る。籍治・藉治ならば鮫皮を敷きあてるやうにこする意に解し得よう。
鮫皮おろし3
鮫皮おろし2
蘧蒢(きょじょ):むしろ。

梟魚:朝鮮・黄胤錫『頤齋亂稿』稿本第二十册、甲午(西暦1774)九月十四日の「雜志」の「玳瑁」條の眉注に曰く、「梟魚は即ち鮫魚なり」と。稿本第114葉、pdf233。
玳瑁(濟州)。古人云:身似龜、嘴如鸚鵡、牝牡一生不再交。乳卵、大如彈丸、望卵而孕。其大者如籧篨。背上有魿、大如扇、共十二葉、發魿則見文。先煮之、刀截任意。冷則以梟魚皮錯治之、以枯條木葉瑩之。
自注:
梟魚即鮫魚也。皮有石齒、甚利。亦曰䱜魚、亦曰鯊、亦沙魚。俗曰大浪셔오、即鯊魚二字古華音也。

雌雄が一生に一度しか交接しないといふのは『本草綱目』などに對する解釋である。
黃胤錫は朝鮮の實學派の儒者。
魿は鱗の別體。

『南州異物志』の文面で、甲羅が大きいといふ情報は、 
 范成大『桂海虞衡志』の十三片に通じる。

枯葉で磨いて光澤を持たせるとはどうしたことか。紙やすりの代りになるのだらうか。學生曰く、確かに職人は或る種の枯葉でこするのだといふ。

『異物志』は後の「廣韻」にも引かれるが、通常は後漢の『異物志』ではなく、三國の萬震の『南州異物志』であらう。但し確定できない。

大學院の授業で扱ってゐる長崎の鼈甲、すなはち玳瑁。玳瑁の鱗は盤や扇のやうに大きいと、北宋・蘇頌「本草圖經」の逸文や『本草綱目』などに書いてあるので(リンク)、 下は本草綱目卷四十五介部「玳瑁」リンク。
はて、そんなに大きいのかな、背中の大きさは扇よりもかなり大きいし不思議だと思ったのだが、『本草綱目』に次に引いてある南宋・范成大『桂海虞衡志』によれば、玳瑁の甲羅は十三片と決まってゐるのださうだ。だから一枚づつは大きいのだな。『桂海虞衡志』の原文は逸してをり、諸本一覽が戸崎哲彦論文に載ってゐる。
戸崎哲彦「范成大「桂海虞衡志」第一篇「志巌洞」の復元 上 : 中国山水文学における"巌洞遊記"としての位置づけ」(島大言語文化・言語文化学科編 21 , pp.1 - 39 , 2006)
戸崎一覽表をみると、諸本中で汪士漢『秘書廿一種』(1668年)が比較的に完備してゐるやうだ。『秘書廿一種』は各地にあるが、
インターネットに出てゐるのは1808年刊のバイエルンミュンヘン州立圖書館藏『秘書廿八種』卷十一「桂海虞衡志」。頁十八、十九に玳瑁。
廿八種といふのはどうも廿一種から後に増補されたらしい。
范成大桂海虞衡志_秘書廿八種11バイエルン藏
   ▲バイエルン藏本。  

南宋・范成大『桂海虞衡志』「志蟲魚」(蟲魚を志す):
瑇蝟、形如龜黿輩。背甲十三片、黒白斑文相錯、鱗差以成一背。其邊裙闌、闕嚙如鋸齒。無足而有四鬣、前兩鬣長、状如檝、後兩鬣極短。其上皆有鱗甲、以四鬣櫂水而行。海人養以鹽水、飼以小鱗。俗傳甲子庚申日輒不食、謂之瑇瑁齋日。其説甚俚。
(玳瑁、形、龜黿の輩の如し。背甲十三片、黒白斑文相錯す、鱗差して以て一背を成す。其の邊は裙闌なり、缺嚙すること鋸齒の如し。足無くして四鬣あり、前兩鬣長く、状は楫の如し、後兩鬣は極めて短し。其の上に皆な鱗甲あり、四鬣を以て水を櫂して行く。海人養ふに鹽水を以てし、飼するに小鱗を以てす。俗に傳ふ、甲子庚申の日は輒ち食らはず、これを玳瑁の齋日と謂ふと。其の説甚だ俚なり。)

裙闌(裙襴)は、もすそ(裳、スカート)の飾り。
闕齧(缺齧)は、辛棄疾の漢詩に曰く、
「巨石亭亭缺囓多、懸知千古也消磨。人間正覓擎天柱、無奈風吹雨打何。」
(臺灣の漢詩サイト)

ついでながら德川文化九年刊本(文化九年、須原屋伊八刊本)も一つの善本で、
胡起望・覃光廣『桂海虞衡志輯佚校注』(四川民族出版社, 1986.9)などに用ゐられてゐる。
范成大桂海虞衡志文化9年須原屋伊八刊本國會藏
   ▲國會藏、文化九年、須原屋伊八刊本
他に四庫全書本リンク:
http://img.kanripo.org/general/skqs/wyg//WYG0589/WYG0589-0378d.png

范成大『桂海虞衡志』を參考しつつ書かれた周去非『嶺外代答』にも十三片の説が載ってゐて、玳瑁とともに鼈(べつ、すっぽん)の甲羅も十三片ださうだ。
周去非『嶺外代答』の『知不足齋叢書』本の卷十の「玳瑁」リンク。周去非嶺外代答知不足齋叢書卷十玳瑁



「江戸鼈甲 : 東京都伝統工芸品」
東京鼈甲組合連合会 [編] [2008.1]
https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BB1521142X
http://www.dentoukougei.jp/tokyo/10.html
〒103-0004東京都中央区東日本橋2-27-7
東京装粧会館408号室
電話     03-5607-0888

.


「ウルトラ、ヴェノナ、エシュロン、マスクすら知らない日本でいいのか」
  北岡 元   小谷 賢    中西 輝政
  諸君 39(2), 219-229, 2007-02
https://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/40015188299
 いや~我々一般國民は知りませんよそんなもの。特に私は二十世紀そのものに興味無いし。で、このヴェノナ文書を虎ノ門ニュースで江崎道朗氏が解説してゐる(下方ビデオ1:12:00から)。一言で言へば、ルーズベルト政權は完全に蘇聯スパイに操縱されてゐた。戰後の日本占領政策でもアメリカは蘇聯スパイに操縱されてゐた。東大京大教授陣がことごとく公職追放に遭ったのも蘇聯の意向だった。
 そこで今の日本。現在の日本にもスパイが這入り込でゐるのは一般にも言はれてゐる。ただ具體的に分からないので想像するしかない。民主黨政權がスパイで作られたとか言ふ人が多い。江崎氏の解説でも今の日本のメディアや藝能人などがスパイだらけだと言ふ。
 しかし變ではないか。簡單に常駐防衞できる尖閣を、防衞が難しいかのやうな噂を自衞隊OBから流して、故意に空島にしてゐる。また移民法でチャイナ枠を擴大したり、北京訪問で通貨スワップ。その他もろもろ。全部自民黨がやってることだ。日本を駄目にすることを全部やってる。不思議ではないか。スパイに操縱されてゐるといふならば現在の政府そのものではないか。保守派論壇の中にも現政府を批判できないやうな信者層の空氣をうまく作り上げてゐる。何故それを江崎氏は言はないのか。江崎氏自身がデュープdupeではないのか。勿論、私は具體的に今のスパイのことは何も分からない。國民は知りたいが知り得ない。韓國がわざと日本の輿論を刺激するのも、チャイナファシズムから目をそらさせる陰謀だと思はれるが、證據が無い。
 
1:12:00からヴェノナ文書。


 さらに江崎氏曰く。レーガン大統領はハリウッド藝能界内のスパイを内部告發することから政界に轉身した。トランプ大統領はそのレーガン氏を非常に尊敬してゐると。なるほど。矢張りトランプさんに頼るしか、21世紀の救ひは無ささうだ。なぜなら江崎氏の論理から言へば日本政府は操縱されてゐるから。
關聯:
http://senkaku.blog.jp/2018102877993631.html
「トランプ政權が倒れたら、恐怖の21世紀、孤立無援のトランプ大統領を聲援しよう」


齲齒(くし、うし)の病因分布。普通ならば繩文と彌生との差を想起する。單に西高東低ではなく、中國よりも近畿の比率が高い。ただこの圖では縣ごとに分けてゐないので、九州の南部(含沖繩)と北部との差、瀬戸内海側と出雲土佐との差、などが分からない。神武東征の通りならば九州北部・瀬戸内海・近畿が高いだらう。細かな情報が欲しい。
齒エナメル分布

子供の虫歯なりやすさ「西高東低」…原因は不明
2018年11月30日 10時11分 讀賣。
 西日本の子供は虫歯になりやすい?――。富山大は、日本小児歯科学会との共同研究で、虫歯になりやすいとされる「エナメル質形成不全」の児童の割合が、西に行くほど高いことが判明したと発表した。全国規模の調査で地域差が明らかになったのは初めて。研究グループは原因を究明し、虫歯予防に役立てたいとしている。
 研究は、富山大の関根道和教授らの研究グループが行った。全都道府県の7~9歳の児童4496人について、左右上下の第1大臼歯の表面にあるエナメル質を調べ、黄色や茶色に変色するなどの異常がないかを確認した。
 この結果、エナメル質形成不全の児童の割合は、▽北海道地方14・0%▽東北地方11・7%▽関東信越地方18・5%▽東海北陸地方19・3%▽近畿地方22・3%▽中国地方19・8%▽四国地方28・1%▽九州地方25・3%――と、「西高東低」の傾向になっていた。
 関根教授によると、第1大臼歯は妊娠中~乳幼児期に形成され、6歳頃から永久歯として出現する。エナメル質が正常に形成されるには、カルシウムやビタミンD、リンの摂取が必要だが、地域差が生じた理由は分からないといい、「日照時間や気象条件、生活習慣が関係している可能性がある。今後、詳細な研究が必要だ」としている。




黄色人種はエナメル質が薄い。黄色人種には繩文古モンゴロイドを含むのだらうか。



李鼎元はほぼ「琉球を愛した」と言へる人物。
一例リンク。 
http://senkaku.blog.jp/archives/32221975.html
 清國東限と琉球西限の兩界線を明示し、中間に尖閣諸島。
尖閣史の全體像を一語で道破した「馬齒島歌」。

しかし村尾進論文「球雅の行方、李鼎元の『琉球譯』と淸朝考証學」
平成12年京大東洋史研究會「東洋史研究」59-1。
http://hdl.handle.net/2433/155333
これによれば李鼎元は歸國後に中華思想の反撥に遭ひ轉向した。
現代でも親日派のチャイナ人が
歸國後に反日に轉向するのとよく似てゐる。

ついでながら村尾論文では、日本が琉球を統治してゐることを
清國では充分に認識してゐなかったやうに書いてゐるが、
それは村尾氏全然甘い。清國ではしっかり認識してゐる。

李鼎元畫
  李鼎元の畫作。